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In this essay, which will be published in two parts, the author
argues that the Meech Lake Accord was more than a hastily cobbled
together political deal between the Prime Minister and ten provincial
premiers. Despite tile unattractive process by which the Meech Lake
Accord was struck, and especially defended, despite the disingenuous
character of the arguments most often advanced for its adoption, and
despite its close connection with other aspects of the federal government's
political agenda which many Canadians found suspicious, the Meech Lake
Accord did respond to an important issue in post-patriation
constitutionalism.
A review of Canadian constitutional history, the evolution of
French and English linguistic minorities in Canada, and the
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* Of the Faculty of Law and the Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University; Bora
Laskin Visiting Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1989-1990.
This essay is an extended version of the Laskin Lecture on Public Law delivered at
Osgoode Hall Law School on 8 November 1989. Given that the Lecture immediately
preceded the Annual First Ministers' Conference in Ottawa, many references in the Lecture
text presupposed the imminence of that meeting. These references I have left more or less
in their original form despite the fact that various revisions to this essay occurred some time
after the First Ministers' Conference.
In preparing the lecture for delivery and in revising this text for publication, I
benefitted from the comments of many colleagues at Osgoode Hall and at McGill. I should
like to thank especially Professors Peter Hogg, Allan Blakeney, Richard Janda, Nicholas
Kasirer, Peter Oliver, Wade MacLauchlan, and Daniel Jutras for their several suggestions
about both matters of form and substance. I also wish to record my appreciation to Dean
Donald Greig and the Faculty of Law of the Australian National University in Canberra for
providing me with the opportunity to teach a comparative constitutional law graduate seminar
during the early months of 1990, at which time I was rewriting the Lecture for publication.
The challenge of learning the politics of a new (and strongly centrist) federal structure was
particularly rewarding and greatly assisted me in sharpening the argument of this essay.
Finally, I should like to thank my research assistant, Genevieve Saumier, who worked tirelessly
during the last edit of this text.
I Part II will appear in the forthcoming issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal: Volume
29, No. 3.
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complementary motifs of French-Canadian and English-Canadian
survivance leads the author to conclude that the forces which generated
the Meech Lake Accord have been perennial features of "British North
American" political life since 1759. The symbolic purpose of the Meech
Lake Accord was to illustrate that, notwithstanding significant
demographic and economic changes in Canada, and notwithstanding that
the patriation exercise operated a profound transformation of the complex
underpinnings of Canadian federalism, these traditional forces would still
play a significant role in defining the values of the country.
The failure.of the Meech LakAccord does not mean that these
forces are now spent. Rather, it means only that the present "federal"
structure within which they have been accomodated since 1867 probably
is no longer appropriate for the task. The author concludes with a
prognosis for what the institutional redesign likely to emerge over the
next few years will be - a framework he characterizes as "heteronomy."
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I. INTRODUCTION
Some twenty years ago, in the fall of 1970, I remember
attending a "teach-in" in Osgoode Hall's Moot Court Room, where
I listened to a distinguished group of professors assess the
implications of the recent proclamation of the War Measures Act
2
by the Trudeau government. My recollection is that the vast
majority of my fellow students came to the meeting fully supportive
of Cabinet's attempt to suppress the "apprehended insurrection,"
even with the Army, if that were to prove necessary. By contrast,
the unanimous opinion of those on the podium, whatever their
position on the political spectrum, was that the Public Order
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. W-2.
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Regulations3 issued under the Act were offensive to received ideas
about civil liberties and constitutional practice in Canada. Indeed,
most Osgoode professors had already signed a telegram of protest
sent to the Prime Minister. Much of the discussion that day focused
on freedom of association and the right of dissent, the protection of
minorities against majorities, and the proportionality of the legal
remedy deployed to the political crisis then at hand. On these
issues of constitutional policy, the cleavage between speakers and
audience was most apparent.
But there was another strand to the debate which highlighted
what, for lawyers, is usually thought to be a more basic issue.
Implicit in the delegation of wide regulation-making powers to the
federal cabinet, and in their sub-delegation to the state's coercive
agencies such as the R.C.M.P. and the Canadian Army, was an affront
to the Rule of Law values informing Canadian constitutionalism.
Here, greater consensus between professors and students seemed to
emerge. For, in this respect, the concern about the invocation of
the War Measures Act could be seen to track the concern expressed
by Quebec civil libertarians during the 1940s and 1950s about the
use of governmental power by the Union Nationale regime of
Maurice Duplessis to suppress proselytizing by communists and
Jehovah's Witnesses.4 In both instances it was felt that the realities
of the Parliamentary system were such that a strong Prime Minister
or Premier could induce passage of legislation under which both
police and administrative powers could be wielded, without meaning-
ful judicial scrutiny, against groups and unpopular minorities. This
second concern, therefore, was not so much with safeguarding
traditional civil liberties per se, as it was with controlling unre-
gulated and unchecked exercises of governmental power.
Interestingly, the rhetoric of freedom of speech and
capricious executive power sometimes heard in critiques of the
Quebec government's invocation in December 1988 of section 33 of
3 SOR/70-444.
4 For example, Switznan v. Elbling, [19571 S.C.R. 285; Saumur v. Quebec (City of),
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Lamb v. Benoit, [1959] S.C.R. 321; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R.
121.
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the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 to legitimate the
prohibition of outdoor commercial signs in English as set out in Bill
178,6 is very similar to that which accompanied civil liberties protests
of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. It is also similar to the overblown
language which was used to express the abuses said to attend the
inclusion of the "distinct society" clause in the Meech Lake Accord.7
Of course, although other constitutional lawyers have explicitly made
this connection in their analyses of contemporary events in Quebec,
the spectre of Maurice Duplessis and the October Crisis are raised
here not because I equate Bill 178 and the Meech Lake Accord with
either of these dark constitutional moments. Rather, what I wish to
signal by this introductory juxtaposition of past and present are a
number of other points.
To begin, I mean to draw attention to the important
contribution which has been made by law professors - for example,
McGill's F.R. Scott in the 1950s, the entire Osgoode teaching faculty
in 1970, and former Chief Justice Bora Laskin throughout his
lengthy academic career - to the pivotal constitutional debates in
Canada. University professors in general, and law professors in
particular, have a duty to take positions on issues of public concern
in a manner which rises above purely party-political partisan
advocacy.8 They are charged with helping Canadians discover the
foundations of their constitutional order, the nuances of their
constitutional history, and the promise of their constitutional future.
Each one of us in the law teaching community has a responsibility
to state honestly and openly the present lessons which we judge our
5 Part I of The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
6 An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1988, c. 54.
7 What is popularly known as the Meech Lake Accord comprised a "political Accord"
announced on 30 April 1987, and a "legal Accord" negotiated at the Langevin Block meetings
on 3 June 1987. The latter Accord comprised a "Motion for a Resolution" and the "Schedule
to the Resolution" setting out specific amendments to the Constitution. For a brief history
of the Meech Lake Accord and a text of the various documents see P.W. Hogg, Meech Lake
Constitutional Accord Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1988).
8 1 am aware that not all academic commentary on the Meech Lake Accord was "non-
partisan." For a thoughtful discussion of the co-optation of the academic community by
political interests see, A.C. Cairns, "Ritual, Taboo and Bias in Constitutional Controversies
in Canada, or Constitutional Talk Canadian Style" (1990) 54 Sask. L. Rev. 121.
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constitutional past teaches, even when, as in the present political
context, the personal cost may be quite high.
I also advert to this key event in my own intellectual
development as a lawyer as a clue to one of the unstated themes
of much current constitutional discourse. This is the tendency
among a number of Canadians to see the different voice emanating
from Quebec not as enriching the country's social and political life,
but as somehow constantly working against it. It is no accident that
Bill 178 has been equated by many commentators outside Quebec to
the suspect legislative programme of Maurice Duplessis, rather than
to those of Ontario's Mitchell Hepburn and Alberta's William
Aberhart. It is also no mere coincidence that purported civil
liberties' problems with the Meech Lake Accord were seen primarily
in the light of the political instability of the October Crisis of 1970,
rather than that attendant upon the Winnipeg General Strike in
1919 or the War Measures Act displacement of Canadians of
Japanese origin in the early 1940s. An especially troubling feature
of much public discussion of Quebec politics elsewhere in Canada is
its implicit presumption that French-speaking Canadians have never
really internalized the values of democratic liberalism like other
Canadians. This mistaken presumption, unfortunately, has
discoloured aspects of our constitutional practice from at least the
time of Lord Durham's recommendations for assimilating Quebec's
"priest-ridden hewers of wood and drawers of water."9  Moreover,
if the popular interpretation (as revealed in public opinion polls of
English-speaking Canadians) of the salient events of the Meech Lake
Accord ratification process is any guide, it has still not been
exorcised.
There is a third reason why I juxtapose the constitutional
moments of my former Osgoode teachers with those I now am living
9 This memorable phrase has entered popular discourse as summarizing Lord Durham's
characterisation of the French-speaking habitants of Lower Canada. See G.M. Craig, ed., Lord
Durham's Report, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963) at 27-33. The view that French-
speaking Canadians did not understand the requirements of democratic citizenship gained
widespread academic currency outside Quebec in the late 1960s with the publication of Pierre
Trudeau's book Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968). I refer
in particular to the essay "Some Obstacles to Democracy In Quebec" at 103, which is usually
read as an indictment of French-speaking Canadians rather than the critique of the attitudes
of both linguistic communities which the author intended.
1991]
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in. I want to contrast the unsurprising continuity of certain cultural
and linguistic features of Canadian federalism with the surprising
continuity of the vocabulary and conceptual structure which
English-speaking lawyers and law professors have deployed, over the
last thirty years especially, to address them. Our present scholarly
peril is mistaking the inevitability of the latter for the permanence
of the former. In other words, I believe that a principal reason that
we keep getting what can only be seen as partial answers such as
the Meech Lake Accord (and before it the Constitution Act, 1982) to
our constitutional dilemmas, is because of the partiality of the
questions we ask.10 Moreover, unlike many constitutional commen-
tators in cognate disciplines, jurists seem generally disinclined to
search for larger patterns. True to our training we have sought
comfort in our ability to think about something which is intimately
connected to something else, without thinking about the thing to
which it is connected.
In the pages that follow I attempt to trace the outlines of
alternative ways of conceiving certain of our continuing constitu-
tional quandaries, inspired largely by the insights of other branches
of the Academy.11 The special focus of the analysis is the
10 purposely use the word "partial" in its two distinct senses here. All human
endeavours are partial in the sense of incomplete; it would, in fact, be difficult to conceive
how any constitutional amendment could be otherwise. But constitutional documents need
not, however, always be partial in the sense of partisan or biased; the art of constitutional
amendment is precisely the art of studied ambiguity which, at the same time, recognizes all
existing fields of view, and yet, leaves open the possibility of new perspectives and
interpretations constantly emerging.
As an illustration of this point it is helpful to focus on two phrases which are
bandied about by Canadian political leaders: "national unity" and "national identity." Now
whatever the symbolic utility of these phrases in discourse outside Quebec, they are totally
dysfunctional within Quebec. For unity and identity imply sameness, and a failure to
accommodate diversity. French-speaking Quebeckers have no illusions about the model of
"sameness" which underlies the call for unity, and for this reason are rightly suspicious of the
call for national unity. A similar partiality is reflected by the word "national," which in English
has typically been used as a synonym for state. In French, however, nation connotes "a
people" or "a race." Hence, the 1960s plea about deux nations (now transformed in the
neutered and translatable caique deuxpeuplesfondateurs) and the policy of the Parti Qu6b6cois
in the 1985 provincial election which was labelled affinnation national.
11 Many of the best analyses of Canada's recent constitutional dilemmas have been
advanced by historians, political scientists, economists, sociologists, and public administrators.
Two of the most evocative studies (both of which antedated the 1980s round of constitutional
amendments) are R. Cook, Canada and the French Canadian Question (Toronto: Macmillan,
[voL 29 No. 2
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contribution which the Meech Lake Accord could have made to the
dynamic of relations between French and English-speaking
Canadians. Most of the essay's historical allusions are, to this aspect
of Canadian constitutional politics, viewed primarily from the
perspective of the smaller community of which I am now a member
- English-speaking Quebec. Let me emphasize that I do not assume
either that linguistic conflicts are Canada's only important
constitutional issue, or even that their resolution must control all
other processes of constitutional renovation. But I do believe that
my narrowly focused observations on this fundamental question can
be extrapolated to all dimensions of Canadian constitutive practice
- including such other contemporary conundrums as equality rights,
Aboriginal rights, multiculturalism, federal/provincial relations,
regional economic disparities, Western alienation, and Northern
disaffection with central Canadian paternalism. Much more so than
the patriation exercise of 1982 - which apart from the Charter
focused more on constitutional means than on constitutional ends -
the institutional readjustments proposed in the Meech Lake Accord
required Canadians to consider exactly what kind of polity they
wished to establish or to preserve.
12
1966), and E. Black, Divided Loyalties: Canadian Concepts of Federalism (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1975).
Without pretending in any way to offer a comprehensive list, I should like to
mention several other sources which have influenced my own thinking on problems of
Canadian constitutionalism: D. Johnson, Egalit ou independance, Montreal, Homme, 1965;
R. Cook, Provincial Autonomy, Minority Rights and the Compact Theory, 1867-1921 (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer for Canada, 1969); M. Seguin, L'idde d'independance au Qudbec: Genese et
historique, Trois Riviires, Quebec, Boreal Express, 1971; F. Dumont, La vigile du Quebec:
octobre 1970: L'impasse?, Montreal, Hurtubise HMH, 1971; D.V. Smiley, Canada in
Question: Federalism in the Seventies (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972); A. Breton &
R. Breton, Why Disunity?: An Analysis of Linguistic and Regional Cleavages in Canada
(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980); G. Stevenson, Unfidfilled Union:
Canadian Federalism and National Unity, rev'd ed. (Toronto: Gage, 1982); D.V. Verney, Three
Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State: Canada's Political Traditions (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1986); R. Simeon, Intergovernmental Relations (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1985); D.V. Smiley & R.L. Watts, Intrastate Federalism in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1985); R. Gibbins, Conflict and Unity: An Introduction To
Canadian Political Life (Toronto: Methuen, 1985); and D.V. Smiley, The Federal Condition
in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987).
12 Let me also make explicit a subsidiary point. I do not want to be taken as claiming
that constitutionalism ought to be just about the distribution of organizational power among
discrete geographic, religious, cultural, or linguistic groups. Constitutions ought also to be
1991] 259
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Three main themes inform this essay. They are, first, the
dualist foundations of Canadian constitutional law and practice and
the relation of the Meech Lake Accord to these traditional assizes;
second, the special importance of linguistic minorities, and the very
concept of social groups, to Canadian self-definition; and third, the
unique character of nonrevolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary,
constitutionalism and its implications for this country's political
agenda. Woven into these general themes are several other
filaments. I seek to analyze the particular circumstances in which
the English-speaking minority in Quebec now finds itself, suggesting
its central role in helping to shape the political accommodations
which are certain to arise in the years ahead. I also attempt to
illustrate the various ways in which the Meech Lake Accord could
have been understood as having made a positive contribution to
Canadian constitutionalism. I try to parry the several criticisms of
the Meech Lake Accord which were advanced during the ratification
process, including those expressed most forcefully in reports and
position papers emanating from Manitoba, New Brunswick, and
Newfoundland.13 I then assess in retrospect the legal and political
options that were open to those who sought between November
1989 and June 1990 to salvage the Meech-Langevin agreement,
either in its original form or in a modified form. Lastly, having
initially ended the Laskin Lecture with a modest plea for ratification
of the Meech Lake Accord in a spirit of generosity and inclusiveness,
I now conclude with an equally modest plea for candid recognition
that the political dynamic which produced the Meech Lake Accord
about responses to poverty, radical disparities in income distribution, violence, alienation,
marginalization, and victimization. But, and this is the point being made in the text, in
constitutional law (even despite our modem fixation on Charters of Rights) it is primarily
through questions of institutional design that we begin to work towards articulating
fundamental values. For an excellent illustration of the importance of institutional
arrangements in constitutional law to the promotion of substantive values, see L.H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1988).
13 Manitoba Task Force on Meech Lake, Report on the 1987 Constitutional Accord (21
October 1989) (Chair W.N. Fox-Decent); New Brunswick, Legislative Assembly, Select
Committee on the 1987 Constitutional Accord, Final Report on the Constitution Amendment
1987 (October 1989) (Co-Chairs: R. Simpson & B. Thdriault); Newfoundland & Labrador,
Constitutional Proposal: An Alternative to the Meech Lake Accord (9-10 November 1989).
260 [VOL. 29 No. 2
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cannot be willed away, but must be dealt with as a matter of
constitutional priority.
1 4
II. THE RHETORIC OF THE MEECH LAKE DEBATE:
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH-MAKING
It is appropriate to begin this assessment of the Meech Lake
Accord episode in Canada's constitutional history by reviewing briefly
the rhetoric generated in connection with the ratification exercise.
I do so, notwithstanding the historical and sociological flavour of
much of the essay, in order to highlight the unreality of the
ratification debate, to expose the poverty of most pro-Meech Lake
Accord political discourse, and to suggest from what sources the
justifications for adoption of any similar constitutional agreement
14 It would be dishonest if I were not to disclose that my own position on the Meech
Lake Accord changed between 1987 and 1989. In a lecture delivered in November 1987 1 was
concerned to show that the Meech Lake Accord was a premature exercise of constitutional
revision. Even after acknowledging the defects of the Charter (see R.A. Macdonald,
"Postscript and Prelude - The Jurisprudence of the Charter. Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct
L. Rev. 321 [hereinafter Postscript and Prelude]) I claimed that "by failing to recognize the
subtle interplay of made law and implicit law the Meech Lake negotiations have prematurely
crystallized alternative allocations of authority before the actual exercise of power under
previous constitutional allocations has been evaluated": see R.A. Macdonald, "Of Canoes and
Constitutions: Paddling on Meech Lake" in J. Raffan & B. Horwood, eds, Canexus: The
Canoe in Canadian Culture (Toronto: Betelgeuse, 1988) 161 at 169. Shortly afterwards, in
February 1988, I argued against ratification of the Meech Lake Accord on the basis that it,
together with the Free Trade Agreement, reflected an American view of government and the
state, in which the idea of politics as constitutive practice was cast aside. See R.A.
Macdonald, 'Tears Are Not Enough" in 3. Whyte & I. Peach, eds, Re-forming Canada?: The
Meaning of the Meech Lake Accord and the Free Trade Agreement for the Canadian State
(Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1989) 9.
More telling, when I first began to prepare the Laskin Lecture in September 1989
I still held these views, and was preparing to condemn the Meech Lake Accord anew.
Notwithstanding the reaction of the Quebec government to the Supreme Court judgment in
A.G. Quebec v. La Chaussure Brown (1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [hereinafter Chausure
Brown], I felt that the time for fonnal constitutional change was not yet at hand. In addition,
the re-election of the Mulroney government in the fall of 1988 and the implementation of the
Free Trade Agreement left me even more convinced that the Meech Lake Accord reflected an
unwelcome political ideology. But as I worked on the lecture, and especially after I began to
discuss the Meech Lake Accord with various English-speaking constitutional lawyers opposed
to it, I came to the conclusion that, despite what I felt was the continuing validity of my
earlier criticisms, on balance the Meech Lake Accord should be ratified. If anything, events
since last 23 June have convinced me of the preferability of the revised position I took in
November 1989.
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ultimately will have to be drawn. Structurally, the debate between
proponents and opponents of the Meech Lake Accord had three
distinct phases: a predominantly political phase dominated by the
Meech Lake Accord's supporters from May 1987 through December
1988; a predominantly legal phase dominated by its detractors from
December 1988 until the spring of 1990; and a final political phase
in the months leading up to 23 June 1990.15
Many who favoured adoption of the Meech Lake Accord at
first grounded their case solely in the claim that the agreement was
necessary in order to "bring Quebec back into the constitution with
honour and enthusiasm." That is, with few exceptions, early Meech
Lake Accord proponents tended to backstop their position with
unspecific political arguments, the self-evidence of which they took
for granted. Few even thought a traditional legal defence of the
provisions of the Meech Lake Accord might be necessary. The fact
of executive agreement between First Ministers was held to be not
only a necessary precondition to, but also a sufficient justification
for, legislative ratification. Most of those who opposed the Meech
Lake Accord, by contrast, did not attempt to meet these political
arguments, but directed their critique to what they perceived as its
regressive legal and constitutional features. This mutual confess and
avoid strategy meant that rarely in the ratification debate could
thoughtful Canadians evaluate the respective arguments of the
Meech Lake Accord's supporters and detractors. In order, therefore,
to suggest at least some basis for the joinder which will be
attempted in later sections of this essay these conflicting political
and legal perspectives will be canvassed in some detail.
In arguing the case for ratification, defenders of the Meech
Lake Accord displayed especial naivety about the political
sophistication of the general public. They also underestimated the
extent to which the Charter had, by 1987, legalized and personalized
15 The division of the ratification debate into these time frames is, I acknowledge,
impressionistic. Whether those who advanced a legal critique of the Meech Lake Accord
began to gain the initiative in the late summer and early fall of 1988, or whether it took Bill
178 to tip the balance is open to debate.
Moreover, my use of the terms "political" and "legal" requires clarification. I use
neither expression as a pejorative. By political, I mean to emphasize arguments about symbols
and entitlements; by legal, I mean to emphasize arguments about discursive texts and
outcomes.
262 [v€oL. 29 No. 2
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many Canadians' conceptions of the constitution.1 6  Contempt for
the public's new political awareness was no better revealed than in
the constant assertion that the Meech Lake Accord would bring
Quebec back into the Canadian constitutional family; for supporters
of the Meech Lake Accord just as constantly failed to explain how,
and why, it was that Quebec got out of the constitution in such a
way that it became imperative to bring it back in.
This aspect of pro-Meech Lake Accord rhetoric was most
distressing in its incompleteness. After all, absent a unilateral
declaration of independence, the political entity called Quebec, is
and always was, constitutionally a part of Canada. In addition, most
Canadians could not understand how Quebeckers felt excluded by
the patriation exercise when there was little evidence that the
province was worse off, either politically, or in respect of its
legislative jurisdiction, after passage of the Constitution Act, 1982.
For example, it appeared that even though the court challenges to
the federal proposals in 1982 led to Quebec discovering that it never
had a legally enforcable veto over constitutional amendments,17 as
a practical result of the patriation process, it effectively received
something closer to a full veto in the amending process which
resulted, than it had under the Supreme Court's pre-patriation
jurisprudence.18 Again, the argument that Prime Minister Trudeau's
centralizing Charter unilaterally limited the legislative powers of the
16 In this sense, it is remarkable how successful the former Liberal government had been
in its creation of what has been described as "Charter patriotism." For a superb analysis of
this dimension of the patriation struggle see P. Russell, "he Political Purposes of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 30. The transformation
effected by the Charter is also carefully explored in A.C. Cairns, 'The Politics of Constitutional
Conservatism" in R. Simeon & K. Banting, eds, And No One Cheered: Federalsm, Democracy
and the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) at 41; and in A.C. Cairns, "Citizens
(Outsiders) and Governments (Insiders) in Constitution-Making: The Case of Meech Lake"
(1988) 14 Can. Pub. Pol. 21 (special supplement).
17 See Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (patriation
reference); and A.G. Quebec v. A.G. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 [hereinafter Quebec veto].
18 Of course, while it is true that sections 38-49 of the Constitution Acq 1982 re-establish
a Quebec veto over section 41 matters, they do so by giving such a veto to all provinces.
Moreover, a number of items appearing under section 42 are among those for which Quebec
had long insisted that it be accorded a right of veto. Hence, there was some merit to the
claim that Quebec had come out of the 1982 process with a diminished voice in the
constitutional amendment process.
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Quebec National Assembly seemed disingenuous because, as a result
of objections in 1981 from Alberta and Manitoba, the section 33
override was made applicable to most of the Charter having
application to the provinces. And, had not Quebec systematically
availed itself of section 33 since 1982?19 In other words, those who
advanced the argument about the need to bring Quebec back into
the constitutional fold were required to show that it was the
question of legitimacy - and not either strict legality or substantive
result - which lay at the root of the sentiment of exclusion. Yet
this crucial issue of political legitimacy, and its symbolic importance
in Quebec, was seldom explored in any meaningful way in early
pro-Meech Lake Accord commentary.
°
A second failing of Meech Lake Accord supporters was their
inability to address the more detailed legal issues raised by it. By
1987, Canadians had come to believe that the constitution (or at the
very least, the Charter) belonged to them. But proponents of the
Meech Lake Accord failed to argue that the constitutional
arrangements established by it had an impeccable federalist pedigree.
Nor did they attempt to show how these arrangements could be
seen, in themselves, as a positive constitutional development. No
one appeared willing to argue the merits of decentralizing some
federal political authority to provinces by preference to counties,
municipalities, communities, or even to individual citizens. Similarly,
the case was never made that the constitutionalization of the
Supreme Court and the establishment of a consultative nomination
process, the co-operative federal/provincial formulation of national
policy on immigration, and the balancing of the national symbolism
19 The insertion of the override into all existing Quebec statutes was achieved
retroactively by An Act respecting the Constitution Ac 1982, S.Q. 1982, c. 21, and was
continued in each subsequent statute until 1985. In the text I say "most of the Charter having
application to the provinces" because the override cannot apply to provisions relating to
"minority language educational rights" (section 23). Of course, there is a special exception for
Quebec in relation to section 23(1)(a) rights, an exception of which the province also availed
itself prior to 1985.
20 There is, in fact, a good case to be made that both the Charter and the amendment
formula of 1982 were not, substantively, contrary to Quebee's interests; some even argue that
the five Meech Lake Accord themes would not have unravelled the 1982 agreement. See L.E.
Weinrib, "Of Diligence and Dice: Reconstituting Canada's Constitution" [forthcoming, (1991)
U.T.L.J.]. If this is the case, the neglected argument for "political legitimacy" could have been
made forcefully by the Meech Lake Accord's supporters.
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of universal social programmes with the special needs and possibly
innovative solutions of particular provinces reflected a
communitarian vision of the Canadian state more consistent with its
history. Partisans of the Meech Lake Accord also neglected to
promote its contributions to the fashioning of a viable scheme of
intra-state federalism in Canada, under which provincial interests
would be directly incorporated into the operations and institutions
of the central government. Nor, finally, did they even attempt to
make the case that this form of federalism was better suited to
Canada's constitutional situation than the post-War centralist and
administrative model which became increasingly dominant during the
1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s.
21
A large part of the reason for these two failings, it appears,
was a belief that the Meech Lake Accord was self-evidently desirable.
The majority of its early supporters held, almost as an article of
faith, that the agreement successfully reconciled the "political
aspirations" of Quebec Francophones with the reality of Canadian
federalism in a way that frustrated the centrifugal tendencies of
separatism and sovereignty association. From this belief came the
dubious claim that the Meech Lake Accord, and not the patriation
package of 1982, was the true Canadian answer to the promise of
renewed federalism held out to Quebec during the referendum
debate of early 1980.22 But those supporters of the agreement
usually did not show how these political aspirations in Quebec were
more than a power struggle between centralist and decentralist
Francophone political elites.23 In fact, the frequent claim that the
Meech Lake Accord was an acceptable compromise actually
reinforced the perception that nothing more than an in-house power
21 For a brief discussion of what such arguments could have looked like, see Smiley &
Watts, supra, note 11.
22 While it could be argued that the Meech Lake Accord was a necessary complement
to the 1982 patriation package in order to fulfill the promise of renewed federalism, most
Canadians were not prepared to believe that there was nothing in the Constitution Ac, 1982
which responded to the pre-referendum promise.
23 Iis perception was reinforced by the interventions of former Prime Minister Trudeau,
who delighted in painting Mulroney as being "soft on separatism." See, for example, the text
of Mr. Trudeau's presentation to the Senate which is reproduced in D. Johnston, ed., Pierre
Trudeau Speaks Out on Meech Lake (Montreal: General Paperbacks, 1990).
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struggle was at issue. Further, political advocates of the Meech Lake
Accord seldom attempted to demonstrate how its substance might
be understood as a rational response to the menacing socio-
economic context faced by a modern, predominantly French-speaking
Quebec in a largely English-speaking North American environment.
In brief, it was difficult to discern in the various political aspirations
arguments in favour of ratification, any criterion for distinguishing
the constitutional model of renewed federalism under the Meech
Lake Accord from sovereignty-association itself.
Perhaps the most resonant argument advanced by Meech
Lake Accord proponents in the initial stages of the ratification
debate was that relating to a change of style in federal/provincial
politics. The Meech Lake Accord, it was claimed, signalled a new
co-operative era of Canadian constitutionalism, and promoted a
spirit of "national reconciliation" among all governments and among
peoples of all regions. By contrast with the argument of meeting
Quebec's political aspirations, the argument for national
reconciliation was intended to have a pan-Canadian thrust. It bears
notice, however, that the concept meant at least two different things,
depending on whether one was in Quebec or elsewhere in the
country.
As far as the situation in Quebec was concerned, national
reconciliation was somewhat misleading as a characterization of some
deep need in the popular consciousness in the years following
patriation. According to pre-Meech Lake Accord opinion polls, most
Quebeckers did not need to be formally reconciled to Canada and
to its federal government: while they saw the 1982 amendment
process as devious and incomplete, and, while they had outstanding
political aspirations not addressed by that process, nevertheless they
embraced patriation and the general idea of a Charter from the
beginning. Indeed, shortly after the Meech Lake Accord was
announced about ninety per cent of the Quebec population did not
see it as a terribly important constitutional initiative. More cogently,
just as almost all Quebec Members of Parliament voted in favour of
the Meech Lake Accord in 1987, seventy-three of the seventy-five
Quebec MPs in 198? supported the patriation package. Thus, prior
to the initiation of the Meech Lake Accord round, it could be
reasonably argued that it was less the people and the federal
politicians from Quebec than Quebec's provincial political leaders for
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whom reconciliation was important. For it is they (and by implica-
tion the entire provincial political process) who suffered the loss of
credibility when the federal government acted over their
opposition.
24
The theme of national reconciliation did, however, have a
certain cogency for many citizens and politicians in the rest of the
country, especially in the West. Even more intensely than
Quebeckers, Westerners had come to feel alienated from the federal
government. Yet, despite the potential of this idea to ground a
renewed and more explicit vision of at least some of the country's
fundamental commitments and ideals, its actual content for several
of the more vocal Meech Lake Accord proponents was rather
vacuous. National reconciliation seemed to be not much other than
a complaint that Pierre Trudeau's concept of a bilingual country
with a strong and aggressive central government was a misguided
moment in Canadian constitutional history. Some early supporters
even praised the Meech Lake Accord as a way of de-bilingualizing
the country, by conceding that Quebec should be a French-speaking
province as against an acknowledgment that the rest of the country
should be exclusively English-speaking. Others saw it as an
anti-Ottawa document which would prevent further "tax-grabs" such
as the National Energy Policy. Despite the appeal of these
arguments in certain quarters, the incoherence of this essentially
negative conception of national reconciliation with the constitutional
24 The argument set out in this paragraph needs to be nuanced slightly. While there
were certain indications that "national reconciliation" of the people as a distinct issue was less
significant in Quebec than Meech Lake Accord proponents attempted to claim, it is
nevertheless true that memories of the "nuit des longs couteaux" were still vivid. Moreover,
it is difficult to untangle the extent to which Premier .,vesque's refusal to negotiate in the
months leading up to 5 November 1981 was understood by ordinary Quebeckers as a reason
for the hard line taken by the federal government during the final patriation negotiations.
Finally, it is probably the realities of party discipline which offer the best explanation of why
seventy-three of seventy-five federal MPs from Quebec supported the patriation package. It
is probably these same realities that led Quebec Liberals in 1982 to support the Charter and
Parti Qudbecois MNAs in 1987 to oppose the Meech Lake Accord.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that, even prior to the attempt by the
federal government to convince the province (and the rest of the country) of Quebec's hurt,
there was no sense of unease or disquiet among French-speaking Quebeckers. The Charter's
education provisions, the timing of the Supreme Court decision on the Quebec Veto (in my
view a questionable decision), and the incomplete "opting out with compensation" provisions
of the Constitution Act were all very real grievances.
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reform agenda of 1987 was soon obvious. This incoherence was no
better revealed than in the' paradox that it came eventually to lurk
in the position of many who opposed the Meech Lake Accord.
Nevertheless, because no alternative content to the expression
national reconciliation was ever advanced, and because many
constituencies claimed to be disaffected by the Meech Lake Accord,
this pro-Meech Lake Accord argument quickly became a parody of
itself.25
From this summary of the opening arguments offered in
support of the Meech Lake Accord, it is apparent that the cause of
ratification was not well served by its official proponents. Rather,
the strategy adopted did little else than create a "political necessity"
myth about the rationale for the Meech Lake Accord which,
thereafter, ensured that its supporters remained on the defensive,
ever increasing the stakes of the debate by predicting disaster for
Canada should ratification fail.26 Indeed, those constitutionalists
who opposed the agreement gradually came to wrest away the public
relations initiative by painting the Meech Lake Accord simply as a
politician's deal which all thoughtful Canadians should oppose. By
the fall of 1988 five separate legal critiques of the Meech Lake
Accord had gained currency.
2 7
25 In many respects partisan political rhetoric came to control the meaning of the
expression. As the ratification debate proceeded, "national reconciliation" became the federal
government's catch-phrase for 'Trudeau-bashing." While Prime Minister Mulroney's openness
may indeed have brought Quebec back to the constitutional negotiating table, and may also
have given Westerners a sense that their concerns would be taken seriously in future
constitutional rounds, the constant rehashing of Trudeau's machiavellian strategies was
overplayed, especially since most Canadians quickly perceived that the Meech Lake negotiating
process was essentially of the same nature, if not even more machiavellian.
26 By the fall of 1989, this perception was generally shared by thoughtful Canadians,
many of whom had good reasons for opposing the Meech Lake Accord on substantive grounds.
One of the first commentators to recognize how the process itself was generating its own
"necessity" mythology was Ivan Bernier. See "Meech Lake and Constitutional Visions" in K.E.
Swinton & C.J. Rogerson, eds, Competing Constitutional Visions: The Meech Lake Accord
(Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at 239.
27 An illuminating early analysis of the legal and constitutional defects in the Meech Lake
Accord was presented in B. Schwartz, Fathoming Meech Lake (Winnipeg: Legal Research
Institute of the University of Manitoba, 1987). Many of the arguments of the next few
paragraphs are drawn from this book. See also the papers collected in Swinton & Rogerson,
ibid.
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The first of these to emerge was the "progressive" critique,
in which the Meech Lake Accord was condemned for the succor
which it offered to the discredited constitutional agenda of
federal/provincial relations, language rights, and provincialism. The
Meech Lake Accord was also criticized on this basis for reinforcing
the political ethic of executive federalism and elite accommodation.
Implied in this critique was the more general claim that traditional
(or pre-1982) constitutional politics in Canada was outdated because
it served only the interests of the country's political and economic
elites. Those who advanced this claim were especially anxious to
argue that the 1982 round empowered ordinary Canadians and
enfranchised previously excluded constituencies.
Closely linked with this first critique was a second - the
"Charter" argument. These skeptics of the Meech Lake Accord were
deeply troubled by the "distinct society" clause. They feared,
notwithstanding their quasi-entrenchment in 1982, that modern and
more fundamental concerns about the relationship of individual and
state were being moved once again to the bottom of the
constitutional agenda. This critique found support in the refusal at
the Langevin meetings to amend section 16 of the Schedule so that
the "distinct society" clause would be made explicitly subordinate to
all sections of the Charter. This, it was claimed, revealed that
Canadian and Quebec politicians had conspired successfully to
recapture legislative authority to override recent constitutional gains
relating to respect for individual liberty, to the promotion of
equality, and to the greater enfranchisement of women.
The "distinct society" clause also provided a focus for the
third, or "provincial egalitarian" critique of the Meech Lake Accord.
On this view, the clause was inimical to a true federalism. By
creating a special status for one province it fundamentally
undermined the notion of equality of citizens, regardless of
provincial residence, upon which Canadian political institutions were
argued to have been built. Many who took this position also
suggested that the clause would confer additional legislative
jurisdiction on Quebec, not exercisable by other provinces.
A fourth criticism of the Meech Lake Accord, the "centralist"
critique, found its roots in the belief, first advanced by Sir John A.
Macdonald a century ago, that the federal government must be
ascendant for Canada to resist assimilation by the United States.
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Critics argued that the spending power provisions of the agreement
would enfeeble the federal government. These provisions would
also operate a massive power shift to larger and more economically
self-sufficient provinces such as British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario,
and Quebec at the expense of the country's poorer provinces.
Coupled with this critique of the spending power clauses was the
assertion that, by giving up exclusive control over national
institutions such as the Senate and the Supreme Court, the central
government was destroying, in a manner even more complete than
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the quasi-unitary model
of federalism upon which the country was built.
A final objection advanced by opponents of the Meech Lake
Accord may be characterized as the "paralysis" critique. Many early
Meech Lake Accord opponents argued that the extension to all
provinces of a constitutional veto over amendments relating to
federal institutions such as the Senate would nullify all hope for
their reform. Reform of these institutions was seen as necessary to
permit non-central regions of the country to acquire a meaningful
voice in national policy-making. Also connected with this concern
was the belief that other pressing items of constitutional reform -
Western alienation, Aboriginal rights, the accession of the territories
to provincehood, multiculturalism, and regional economic disparity
- would never be addressed if every province were given an
enlarged veto power.
Each of these critiques of the Meech Lake Accord, while
reflecting genuine policy concerns, could have been met immediately
by powerful counter-arguments. Yet the response of political
leaders who supported the Meech Lake Accord was often neither
well constructed nor comprehensive. Even after the Meech Lake
Accord's opponents had seized the initiative, much could have been
said, but was not, for a renewed politics of federal/provincial
relations, an explicit national politics of language rights, and an
enhanced politics of provincialism as central items of Canadian
constitutionalism. 28 Moreover, Meech Lake Accord defenders failed
28 In large measure the root problem with the defence of the Meech Lake Accord was
a failure by the Prime Minister to understand, in any principled way, the political and
constitutional values that were at stake in the Meech Lake Accord amendment process. All
he seemed to be offering was a change of political style, and a few patchwork amendments
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to point out the various confusions and inconsistencies in the
standard critiques of it. The special financial and legislative
arrangements put in place to accommodate the Maritime provinces
(and the recent section 92A amendment put in place for the West)
were rarely mentioned in counter-argument to the "provincial
egalitarian" critique of the "distinct society" clause. The difference
between equalization and shared cost programmes was seldom raised
in rebuttal to those advancing the "centralist" critique who feared for
the financial viability of small provinces. Finally, three smaller
provinces opposed to the amending formula because it invited
constitutional "paralysis" were themselves paralysing an amendment
supported by seven provinces with approximately ninety per cent of
the country's population. This paradox never rated much commen-
tary by the Meech Lake Accord's defenders. As a result of this
failure to confront the legal arguments against ratification directly,
a second Meech Lake Accord myth developed - the claim that the
agreement was effecting an unprecedented and dangerous
constitutional revolution.
Proponents of the Meech Lake Accord among constitutional
lawyers and scholars did, however, feel compelled to launch a more
sustained counter-attack against the Charter critique. Initially, it
appears that this was because the critique focused directly on the
"distinct society" clause, an element of the Meech Lake Accord most
closely associated with the key political and symbolic goal of
"bringing Quebec into Confederation with honour and enthusiasm."
Typically, one of two approaches was taken in addressing those who
feared that the Charter was being compromised.
Some left-leaning jurists, clearly acting independently of the
"official" position, responded to the invocation of a return to the fall
prior to Charter redemption by arguing that the Charter was itself
the fall, and the Meech Lake Accord really signalled the return to
Eden. In support of this thesis, they noted that the Charter
to deal with specific grievances. Because he did not attempt to provide, as did Prime Minister
Trudeau earlier in the decade, an appeal either to the historical forces which were at the root
of the proposed amendments or to arguments drawn from political theory, his defence of the
Meech Lake Accord always appeared to be grounded in political pragmatism rather than
constitutional principle. Not surprisingly, most constitutional lawyers and commentators who
supported the rationalizing project of the Constitution Act 1982 took particular affront to this
conception of constitution-making.
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
constitutionalized what may be considered the "old property of
private holdings" and the "old personality in which corporations
counted equally with private citizens," just at a time when Canadians
were finally escaping the enslavement of industrial capitalism and its
legal offspring. These writers observed, for example, that the most
successful deployment of the Charter had been by large corporations
and that due process guarantees had often been invoked in aid of
challenges to social welfare schemes, rather than in aid of the
privately oppressed. Again, Charter skeptics on the political left
pointed out that when one operates a constitutional "cram-down" by
means of an entrenched Bill of Rights, all political questions become
merely definitional. In consequence, they argued, one saddles
Canada's unrepresentative and unelected courts with intractable
claims, like those thrown up by the Daigle9 litigation, which should
be settled by Parliament. For those who defended the Meech Lake
Accord on this basis, the Charter should have no presumptive
primacy in Canadian constitutional law, and should not be permitted
to elevate judicial rhetoric to the canon of Canadian constitutional
discourse. To the extent that the Meech Lake Accord agreement
could be read as effecting a rebalancing of Parliamentary and
judicial initiative, it was to be welcomed.30
The second, and official, tack advanced by those who sought
to meet the Charter critique of the Meech Lake Accord was to argue
for the reconciliation of the two constitutional texts. Nothing in the
Meech Lake Accord, they claimed, not even the "distinct society"
clause, actually compromised any Charter rights. At best this clause
provided an interpretive tool and a symbol by which the Quebec
government could proclaim its special role in the Canadian
federation. According to those who took this view, the "distinct
society" clause would not trump, but rather, would need to be read
into, section 1 of the Charter. Despite the a contrario implication
of section 16 of the Schedule to the Meech Lake Accord Resolution,
29 Tremblay v. Daigle (1989), 62 D.L.R. (4th) 634 (S.C.C.).
30 The most persuasive statement of this Charter-sceptical position is that of M. Mandel,
The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson,
1989). But, unlike some of the Meech Lake Accord's defenders on the political left (for
example, Andrew Petter), Mandel does not claim that the Meech Lake Accord redresses this
defect of the Charter. He, in fact, asserts the contrary.
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there were, consequently, no new Charter-contrary justificatory
arguments which could be advanced under section 1 as a result of
the "distinct society" clause. More generally, there could be no new
legislative jurisdiction flowing to the Quebec National Assembly
under the clause. As a symbol, the clause merely confirmed a
well-understood political reality in an inclusive manner. It
acknowledged the special situation of the French language in
Quebec and the singular responsibility of the provincial government
for "preserving and promoting" Quebec's linguistic and cultural
distinctiveness.
In view of this targeted counter-offensive and partial joinder
of issue by the Meech Lake Accord's defenders, the second phase of
Meech Lake Accord discourse assumed an enhanced profile among
constitutional lawyers and scholars as debate came to focus on the
legal relationship of the Meech Lake Accord to the Charter
Opponents of the agreement asserted the unreality of believing
either that, as a whole, the Meech Lake Accord would do anything
to redress the so-called constitutional dislocation generated by the
Charter, or that the "distinct society" clause would not significantly
colour Charter interpretation. They argued that even if the Meech
Lake Accord were to put a minor brake on government by the
Supreme Court, and even if this were desirable (a point they
contested), the specific terms of the Meech Lake Accord were still
a reflection of brokerage politics of the worst kind. Far from
emerging as a consensus proposal out of an open and public
dialogue among those who had a direct interest in certain sections
of the Charter, the Meech Lake Accord arrived half-baked from the
closed sessions at Meech Lake and was not significantly improved by
the also secret Langevin Block meetings.3
1
31 Because debate was finally engaged on the charter issue, a significant part of the
academic critique of the Meech Lake Accord came to focus on its "political" character. A
typical reaction was to characterize the Meech Lake Accord as the result of "high stakes horse-
trading" or "wheeling and dealing." However true this might have been, it is not itself a
reason for believing that the "distinct society' clause compromises the Charter. Further, many
who objected to the failure to make the "distinct society' clause subordinate to the Charter
were reacting to a sense of having had their "property" (Charter rights) dealt with without their
consent. Be that as it may, far from engaging a legal dialogue, the very accusation of
brokerage politics gave momentum to the re-emergence of a political phase in the debate
which culminated in the "hard-ball" strategy unveiled in the last months of the ratification
process.
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These critics also advanced a substantive rebuttal. They
claimed that the refusal to make the "distinct society" clause subject
to the Charter amounted to no more than constitutionalizing
uncontrolled provincial "majoritarianism" in Quebec. In making this
part of their case, they invariably attempted to link the clause with
Quebec's language legislation. This linkage was assisted by Premier
Bourassa's own peculiar statement in the spring of 1989 to the effect
that, if the Meech Lake Accord had already been ratified, the
Quebec government would not have needed to invoke the
notwithstanding clause in order to protect the French language in
Quebec through Bill 178. Surely, constitutionalists suggested, this
admission proved the dangers of the Meech Lake Accord to the
Charter. It is hardly a reason to support a constitutional amendment
that it permits civil liberties to be infringed, and indeed facilitates
their infringement. Further, is it not better for a government which
seeks to override the guarantees of the Charter to be compelled to
do so explicitly through section 33? Finally, to override Charter
guarantees through an interpretive device would necessarily lead to
interminable standardless litigation and the further politicization of
Canadian courts. From these various thrusts and counter-thrusts
about the relation of the "distinct society" clause to the Charter, a
third Meech Lake Accord myth emerged. This was the belief that
ratification of the Meech Lake Accord would send an unmistakable
signal to Quebec that a cavalier attitude towards the Charter would
be acceptable to the rest of the country.
Such then were the dominant themes and myths advanced by
lawyers and politicians during the first two phases of the ratification
debate - that is, at least until the late autumn of 1989.32 As one
commentator lamented, the discourse was often ill-informed and
peevish. Few of the myths that sustained both the defence and the
32 While it is impossible to cite all the articles and books generated by the Meech Lake
Accord ratification process, the list which follows gives a representative perspective on the
debate as it unfolded between June 1987 and December 1989. See R.A. Forest, dd.,
L'adhsion du Qudbec h l'Accord du Lac Meech: Points de vue juridiques et politiques,
Montreal, Thmis, 1988; Whyte & Peach, supra, note 14; Swinton & Rogerson, supra, note
26; R. Gibbins, ed., Meech Lake and Canada: Perspectives From the West (Edmonton:
Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988) [hereinafter Perspectives Fron the West]; (1988) 14
Can. Pub. Pol., special supplement '"he Meech Lake Accord'; "Forum: Meech Lake" (1989)
38 U.N.B.L.J. 217; and L. Ingle, ed., Meech Lake Reconsidered (Hull: Voyageur Press, 1989).
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critique of the Meech Lake Accord were exposed as such. Worse,
by the time of the First Ministers' meeting in early November 1989,
the Meech Lake Accord's meaning had been reduced to a series of
superficial antinomies. The most powerful among these were paired
first, as the "if you are against the Meech Lake Accord, you are
anti-Quebec" versus the "if you are in favour of the Meech Lake
Accord, you are anti-Charter" dual monologue; and second, as the
"the Charter which was a people's constitution" versus the "the
Meech Lake Accord is simply a politician's ploy, reflecting only the
present exigencies of a self-serving deal between Canadian First
Ministers" dual monologue.
While few serious critics believed that Quebec's aspirations
and the goals of the Charter were irreconcilable, or deprecated the
Meech Lake Accord as being no more than a politician's ploy, the
ahistoricism which these two sets of antinomic claims reflected led
to another myth that captured many legal analyses of the Meech
Lake Accord. This is the myth of constitution as definition.33 While
such a view typically has broad popular appeal, it is apparent even
in certain aspects of the governmental documents emanating from
Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland in the days leading up
to the First Ministers' meeting. Together these three reports
offered a critique of the Meech Lake Accord which took up and
sharpened the legal arguments advanced in the middle stages of the
ratification debate. But each also got sidetracked into exhaustive
analyses of particular words such as "distinct society" - suggesting
linguistic reformulation (much as one re-writes the ambiguous terms
of a contract or attempts to use detailed regulations to define the
words of a statute) as the solution to most of the Meech Lake
Accord's supposed flaws.34 In retrospect, it seems clear that these
linguistic analyses often missed the larger meaning of the agreement
which the offending words necessarily only partially captured.
However, the leader of the Parti Qu~b6cois, Mr. Parizeau,
33 For a cogent critique of this view of constitutions, and an examination of alternate
views, see R. Cook, "Nationalism and the Nation State" in R. Cook, ed., The Maple Leaf
Forever (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986).
34 See, for example, the suggested preamble and section 2 of the Constitution set out in
the Newfoundland proposal, supra, note 13 at 2-3.
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understood very well both the destructive power of ahistorical
linguistic critique and the political value of historically-rooted
symbols. He foresaw the force of the symbol "distinct society" in
Quebec, and in order to devalue its appeal he vigorously
campaigned to reduce its, meaning to definitions. Hence, his
constant challenge to Premier Bourassa to state whether the clause
would override the Charter and to opine whether it actually would
give Quebec any new legislative jurisdiction. This technique for
transforming a symbol into a sign was also adopted by many
academic critics of the Meech Lake Accord outside Quebec, who
sought to have proponents define "distinct society" in detailed terms
which would never have been expected from those promoting the
Charter's equally symbolic expression "fundamental justice."
Despite their occasional lapses into "definitionalism," the
three provincial reports presented in the fall of 1989, together with
the Ontario response to the Manitoba and New Brunswick
documents35 and its assessment of the Newfoundland constitutional
proposal,36 did begin, however briefly, to reorient substantive debate
about the Meech Lake Accord among politicians. There was even
hope that sufficient momentum for continuing reflection would make
the drafting of a "parallel Accord" inevitable. Yet as the deadline
for ratification approached a few months later, defenders of the
Meech Lake Accord increasingly came to rest their case on the basis
that it was a "done deal" which could not be amended. Rather than
actively create a positive Meech Lake Accord symbolism of dialogue
and responsiveness in the same manner as a positive symbolism was
created to sanctify the Charter in the public mind, they reverted to
the same back-room political manoeuvring which tarnished the case
for ratification at the outset of the debate.37 This tactic generated
Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Assessment of the Manitoba and New
Brunswick Reports on the Mcech Lake Accord (Staff Paper) (2 November 1989).
36 Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Assessment of tire Newfoundland
Constitutional Proposal: An Alternative to the Meech Lake Accord (Staff Paper) (27 November
1989).
37 Some of the Prime Minister's own statements in the spring of 1990 were most curious.
To attack the Charter ('It's not worth the paper its written on') because of section 33, to
claim that all Canadian consitutional amendment processes were the result of backroom deals,
to attempt to manipulate the premiers through the media in early June, to retreat from the
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a fifth, and ultimately devastating Meech Lake Accord myth: the
view that because the constitutional process was sordid, the Meech
Lake Accord should be rejected on this basis alone.
The most unfortunate consequence of this last-minute effort
was not, as many first thought, the failure of ratification of the
Meech Lake Accord. It was to be its effect on future efforts at
constitutional renovation. However flawed the delegitimating myths
propounded by certain Meech Lake Accord opponents, they have all
gained currency as constitutional truths. And, however sound the
legitimating ideas sustaining the Meech Lake Accord, they have now
been thoroughly discredited in public opinion. 38  Regrettably, the
absence of a theory of Canadian constitutionalism patent in the
agreement itself, or in any of the supporting documents circulated
by the federal government, or in any public arguments made by
either federal or provincial politicians, placed an impossible burden
on those who attempted, despite the indifference of the Meech Lake
Accord's political proponents, to explain its genesis and to justify its
overall tenor. The rhetoric of the ratification debate, and the myths
that emerged from it, have seriously harmed Canadian constitution-
alism by undermining the public's confidence that there is a history,
symbolism, and vision of the country which is capable of sustaining
it in the future. In the next sections of this essay, what these
various themes might have been in relation to the Meech Lake
Accord, and why they have continuing relevance in post-Meech Lake
Accord Canada will be addressed in detail.
view that the Meech Lake Accord had to be ratified within three years on the day before
these three years were to expire; all seemed unworthy of a Prime Minister attempting to
ensure the success of a constitutional amendment process. As one media commentator put
it, the reason there could be no further substantive negotiation is that the Prime Minister had
no overall vision of what he was trying to accomplish.
38 1 am not claiming that there were no good reasons for opposing the Meech Lake
Accord - only that the bad ones have gained the status of constitutional truth; similarly, I
am not claiming that there were no bad reasons given for ratifying the Meech Lake Accord
- only that the good ones have now been completely discredited. These two consequences
of the politicking in the final stages of the ratification debate also mean that future exercises
of constitutional amendment undertaken to respond to Quebec's concerns will be badly
tarnished before they even begin.
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Ill. TWO THEORIES OF CONFEDERATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS
In order to situate better the political events which
culminated in the Meech Lake Accord, it is important to recall that
the claims advanced by the Quebec government between May 1986
and May 1987 did not (as many of the Meech Lake Accord's
politically-partisan defenders wish to imply) first arise only in
reaction to the patriation process of 1982. Nor were they (as many
of the Meech Lake Accord's detractors asserted) merely the "thin-
edge-of-the-wedge" of the post-Quiet Revolution independence
agenda promoted by Quebec nationalists. On the contrary, these
claims were the late twentieth century version of fundamental
Canadian constitutional concerns having an ancient pedigree.
Indeed, those concerns were manifest not only in the British North
America Act, 186739 but even earlier, in the Act of Union, 1840,40
the Constitutional Act, 1791,41 and the Quebec Act, 1774.42
The reason for their persistence, I believe, can be at least
partly clarified by a brief review of the usual components of a liberal
constitution. Admittedly, political scientists and lawyers have
advanced a wide variety of models for the design of constitutions.43
In almost all, however, the following items appear as basic
components, whether expressed in a written document or documents,
or whether implied by practices and conventions. First, constitutions
usually define - by a formula such as "we the people" - who is
39Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3 (formerly British North America Act
1867) [hereinafter Constitution Act 1867].
40 Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 4.
41 Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 3.
42 Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 2.
43 See, for a brief summary of salient features of the English constitutional model viewed
from a Canadian perspective, G.-A. Beaudoin, La Constitution du Canada: Institutions, partage
des pouvoirs, droits et libertds, Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1990 at 5-50, and P.W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 1-308. As leading
examples of Anglo-Canadian theorizing about basic constitutional issues, see G. Marshall,
Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980); A. Breton & A. Scott, The Design of
Federations (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980); and W.E. Conklin,
Images of a Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
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establishing the new constitutional order, and enumerate which
groups, and which individuals, form a part of the political
community. Second, they normally explain, by preamble or by an
independent but allied document such as a Declaration of
Independence, a Declaration of Rights, or a Report of a Founding
Convention, the leading principles and goals upon which the new, or
renewed, state is to be erected. Third, and typically closely
associated with the second objective, is the announcement or
proclamation of political sovereignty. A fourth constitutional
component is the structuring of the organic functions of government,
including the relationships of executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. Fifth, especially since the u.s. precedent of 1789,
constitutions will express a choice about whether a unitary, federal,
or confederative system is to be adopted, and if either of the latter,
about what intra-state institutions are required, and about what
powers should be assigned to each constituent. Sixth, independent
of division of legislative powers issues, modern federal constitutions
usually allocate the getting and giving of revenue: taxation,
borrowing and spending, including transfer payments and
equalization. Seventh on the list of constitutive elements in modern
liberal constitutions is the imposition of counter-majoritarian
constraints on legislative and governmental activity through
entrenched, or partly entrenched, civil liberties guarantees. Eighth,
and finally, constitutions typically establish special institutions for
their interpretation and provide for complex processes governing
their amendment.
Most of these items can be found (albeit not always
explicitly) in those eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century
Imperial statutes which together comprise the written part of the
Canadian constitution. Others are captured by the salient events of
English history which comprise the "common law of the
constitution." Many find their deposit only in the elaborate
conventions and political accommodations which have grown up
since 1763, and in the myths and symbols of Canadian self-
definition.4 4 It follows that Canada's constitutional documents and
44 One of the best summaries of these sources is S. Scott, The Constitution, Government
and Legal System of Canada" in H.H. Stikeman et al., eds, Doing Business in Canada (London:
Oyez, 1985) c. 2.
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practices often conceal their true import.45 Despite the significance
of each of the several components just noted to understanding and
interpreting the whole Canadian constitution, in the concrete, it has
been through the single lens of federalism that all the other basic
issues have usually been perceived since 1867. Until recently,
Canadian constitutional lawyers have been compelled, by the limits
of their own constitutional vision, to collapse almost all these items
into variations on the theme of federalism and the "distribution of
powers" provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867.46 Indeed, the
initial confederative statute, which created a federal state from the
ashes of the 1840 Union of Canada East and Canada West, has had
a powerful hold on the imagination of constitutional scholars and
commentators. While the Meech Lake Accord could, and should,
have been understood in terms other than those of classical
federalism, and while pre-Confederation Imperial Statutes have many
important lessons for contemporary constitutionalism, these other
texts will not be the focus of the present section. Faithful to
received tradition (even while acknowledging its limitations), the
analysis which follows immediately is grounded in federalism issues,
and in the Constitution Act, 1867.
Over the past century and one-quarter, various approaches
to Canadian federalism have found expression in currents of
For an attempt to exhume several of these hidden themes see R.A. Macdonald,
"Procedural Due Process in Canadian Constitutional Law: Natural Justice and Fundamental
Justice" (1987) 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 217 at 218-230.
46 The best illustration of this traditional predominance was the decision by the editor
of the fourth edition of Laskin's Canadian Constitutional Law not to include a concluding
chapter on civil liberties in the casebook. See A. Abel, ed., Laskin's Canadian Constitutional
Law, rev'd 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1975) at iv, where the editor explains that,
notwithstanding his preference for omission, in the revised edition a final chapter on civil
liberties (comprising, however, less than one-tenth of the material) had been added. In the
same casebook, there is not a single other chapter devoted to non-federalism issues. For a
further illustration of the attempt to conceive all issues in terms of federalism, this time in
the context of a new constitutional document, see A. Abel, "Albert Abel's Constitutional
Charter for Canada" (1978) 28 U.T.L.J. 261.
47 Part II of this essay will involve a closer look at other constitutional themes, and other
constitutional documents, in order to show the corrupting influence on Canadian
constitutionalism of the preoccupation with classical "federalism" issues and with the
Constitution Act 1867, and to illustrate the scope of the challenges now facing those who
would redesign the country's political institutions.
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interpretation relating to the Constitution Act, 1867 and its
predecessor Imperial Statutes.48 Today it is commonplace among
constitutional scholars that these Imperial Statutes are capable of at
least two distinct thematic understandings, a centrist, unitary
conception known conventionally as the statute (ioi) theory, and a
decentralist, pluralist conception usually labelled the pact or compact
(pacte) theory.49 To focus attention on two understandings, which
have had some currency in Canadian constitutional scholarship, is
not to imply that alternative or complementary interpretations -
administrative federalism, co-ordinate federalism, dualist federalism
- are descriptively invalid.50 Nor is it to dismiss other contemporary
concerns - about Native Canadians, multiculturalism, regionalism -
as unimportant or unworthy of constitutional recognition. In other
words, the object is not to signal the entire range of federalist
theories which might legitimately claim attention in future processes
of constitutional redesign. Rather, it is to explore those two
understandings which plausibly capture the particular themes and
jurisdictional allocations in the various Imperial Statutes (including,
it is suggested later in this essay, the Canada Act, 1982) by which
the Canadian state was fashioned, between 1763 and 1982, out of a
French Royal colony.
The predominant of the two leading views just noted argues
that these key constitutional texts are simply regulatory statutes of
the Imperial Parliament. As such, they are no more than a
legislative fiat by which certain functions and attributes of
government were established and allocated: in 1774, between
Westminster and Quebec City, and between governor and legislative
48 For a general discussion see A.R.M. Lower, "Theories of Canadian Federalism -
Yesterday and Today" in A.R.M. Lower & F.R. Scott, eds, Evolving Canadian Federalisn
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958) at 3; and A. Johnson, 'Ihe Dynamics of
Federalism in Canada" (1968) 1 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 18.
49 One of the most accessible expositions of these conflicting themes is G.F.G. Stanley,
"Act or Pact? Another Look at Confederation" in Canadian Historical Association, Report of
the Annual Meeting (Ottawa: C.H.A., 1956) at 2.
50 Black, supra, note 11, argues that there have been five major models of federalism
advanced since 1867. The concern here is not to take a political science approach to these
models in action, but rather to sharpen the two thematic views of the Canadian federal system
upon which they are ultimately grounded. For this reason the vocabulary of federalism used
in this essay departs slightly from that typically deployed by political scientists.
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council; in 1791 and 1840, between Upper and Lower Canada, and
between legislative assembly and legislative council; and in 1867,
between provinces and the new federal government, and between
executive and legislature. This view emphasizes the role of the
Constitution Act, 1867 as a strictly legal instrument contributing to
the evolution of full Canadian nationhood, and to the final
achievement of responsible government in a British colony - a
process which commenced in 1763 with the proclamation issuing
from the Treaty of Paris, and which went through several
pre-Confederation reconstitutions, as well as later reformulations in
1931,51 1949,52 and 1982.53  The statute theory also places great
emphasis on the non-cultural and linguistic explanations for
Confederation. These include, notably, the external threat (defence)
rationale and the economic motives for a British North American
Union. Nation-building out of disparate and geographically scattered
colonies was a convenient mechanism for establishing a polity
capable of resisting an invasion from the United States and for
enlarging the commercial empire of the St. Lawrence by acquiring
the soon to be surrendered territory of the Hudson's Bay
Company.5 4 Briefly, on this view the Constitution Act, 1867 is
understood as "constituting" for the first time a political entity called
Canada.
Given their preoccupations with differentiating the
institutional arrangements of what they perceived as the new country
called Canada from the United Kingdom and the United States, it
is hardly surprising that the statute theory and its various themes
have been the intellectual presupposition of most English-language
constitutional histories. Primarily centrist and statist in political
51 Statute of Westminster, 1931 (U.K.), 22 Geo 5, c. 4.
5 2 British North America (No. 2) Ac4 1949 (U.K.), 13 Geo. 6, c. 81.
53 Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
54 For a general discussion of the motives for Confederation, see P.B. Waite, The Life
and Tm es of Confederation, 1864-1867: Politics, Newspapers, and the Union of British North
America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962); Lower & Scott, eds, supra, note 48;
R. Gibbins, Regionalisr Tenitorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1982); and K.H. Norrie, R. Simeon, & M.R. Krasnick, Federalism and Economic
Union in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).
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ambition, this understanding sees the Constitution Act, 1867 as the
key step in Canada's emergence from colony to nation.55 It calls
forth sections 55, 58, 90, section 91 in fine, section 92(10)(c),
sections 93-95, section 96, and section 132 of the Constitution Act,
1867 as evidence that a quasi-unitary state, and not a true
federation, was really intended. Moreover, as reflected in its
antipathy to the Privy Council's constitutional jurisprudence, it only
reluctantly abandons the vision of the federal government's role
anchored in Macdonald's cherished proposal for a legislative union. 6
In its extreme forms, the statute thesis even dismisses federalism as
the unfortunate price which had to be paid for breaking the political
deadlock in the United Canadas, for accommodating the previous
autonomy of the colonies of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and
Prince Edward Island, and for inducing other British North
American settlements, such as those emerging in what soon became
British Columbia and Manitoba, to join the new nation.5 7  On this
view, whatever the subsequent constitutional history of Canada, the
agreements reached at Charlottetown and Quebec City were
designed to relegate the provinces to the status of glorified English
County Councils, and more importantly, were intended fundamentally
to treat the new province of Quebec just as any other province.58
This understanding of Canadian constitutional history, and of
Quebec's role in the federation, it is reasonably clear, is also the
primary vision of Canada reflected in the Charter, and more
generally in the Constitution Act, 1982. The themes of patriation
55 I take this phrase from A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada
(Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1946). For an assessment of this motif in the writing of
Canadian history see J.M.S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History"
in R. Cook, C. Brown, & C. Berger, eds, Approaches to Canadian History (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1967) at 63.
56 For a discussion of this tendency in English language constitutional histories, see A.C.
Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and Its Critics" (1971) 4 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 301.
5 7This perspective is carefully explored in several essays by F.R. Scott, who personally
displayed some sympathy with it. See F.R. Scott, "Centralization and Decentralization in
Canadian Federalism" (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1095.
58 In recent years it is rare for any scholar to take such an uncompromising view of the
Constitution Act 1867. But, for a recent reiteration of this interpretation, see E.A. Forsey,
A Life on the Fringe: The Memoirs of Eugene Forsey (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990)
at 208-15.
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and coast-to-coast rights and freedoms resonate with the nation-
building interpretation of Confederation. Of course, some
commentators claim that the Canada Act, 1982 was really a Quebec
deal, and that Quebec did get preferential constitutional treatment.
Such a mistaken view is usually grounded in a failure to distinguish
the agenda of Pierre Trudeau, Jean Chr6tien, and Andr60 uellet
(who signed the final proclamation on Canada's behalf) from that of
the Quebec government.59 Politically, the patriation exercise was
strongly centralist, and bore little connection to the constitutional
reform agenda promoted by Quebec during the previous two
decades. Even despite its vision of a bilingual federal government
throughout Canada, and entrenched minority language educational
rights under sections 16-23 of the Charter, the Constitution Act, 1982
primarily bore the mark of the statute thesis in its completion of the
process of achieving Canadian sovereignty, in its treatment of
Quebec as a province just like the others, and in its fundamentally
individualistic approach to constitutional side constraints.
To be contrasted with the statute perspective on early
Imperial legislation, on the events leading up to the Constitution
Act, 1867, and on the subsequent evolution of the Act, is the pact
or compact theory of the Canadian constitution. This theory
understands the Confederation agreement reached in 1867 essentially
as one which involved a solemn undertaking between Canada's "two
founding peoples" (deux nations).60 The richness of the expression
59 The fact that three French-speaking Quebeckers promoted the 1982 reform, and that
it was supported by almost all Quebec M.P.s did not, however, make either patriation or the
Charter a Quebec project. The Quebec government, it will be recalled, never accepted the
deal. It manifested its dissent by seeking to have the Supreme Court recognize its veto power
over constitutional amendments (see supra, note 17) and, when that failed, by systematically
inserting the notwithstanding clause in all provincial statutes (see supra, note 19), and finally
by declining to assent to the issuance of a proclamation respecting section 23(1)(a)
contemplated under section 59 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
60 For powerful expositions of this theme see, F.-A. Angers, Essai sur la centralisation:
Analyse deprincipe politique ct dconomnique dans lesperspections canadiennes, Montreal, Presses
de I'Ecole des haute dtudes commerciales, 1960; P. Ferland, "Reflexions sur la Constitution
canadienne," Institut social populaire, Publication mensuelle, no. 460 (June 1952) at 11; and
R. Arks, "La conf6deration: pacte ou loi?" L'action nationale, 34 (1949) (11) at 194-230 &
243-277. The historical significance of this idea was explored long before its renaissance in
the 1950s by A.R.M. Lower, 'Two Ways of Life: The Primary Antithesis of Canadian History"
in Canadian Historical Association, Report of the Annual Meeting (Ottawa: C.H.A., 1943).
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"founding peoples" in this understanding of Confederation should be
noted. At a time when language seems to have taken over all
discussion of relations between French-speaking and
English-speaking Canadians, it is important to remember that the
initial concept of "two founding peoples" was neither statist
(referring to governmental structures), nor merely linguistic. In its
first acceptation, that reflected in the Quebec Act, 1774, the
particularity of this non-Brittanic founding people was recognized
through the restoration in New France of pre-Conquest language
rights, laws and customs, and religion. For compact theorists, the
Constitution Act, 1867 is a further, and more nuanced, legislative
expression of the historic compromise worked out between 1763 and
1774. The Act perhaps sought to advance the agenda of national
defence, economic expansion, decolonization, and responsible
government. However, it was primarily designed to break the
political deadlock in the United Canadas by respecting, in the
institutional arrangements adopted, the linguistic and cultural duality
of mid-nineteenth century Canada. For proponents of the compact
thesis, then, the Constitution Act, 1867 is not merely the arbitrary
federative fiat of the Imperial Parliament; it is the legislative
recognition of a covenant between two societies and between two
peoples. It is not, as statute theorists would have it, the
"constituting" moment of the country called Canada, but is simply
another "reconstituting" of the territory which had been officially
called Canada since at least 1791.61
Since the compact theory as understood in Quebec is less
well known among English-speaking constitutional lawyers, it merits
a brief statement here. The basic argument in relation to the
Constitution Act, 1867 runs as follows. In exchange for their
agreement to participate in a new polity comprising (with the
61 At the risk of repetition, it must be emphasized that the compact theory, and the
notion of two founding peoples which lies behind it, is a theory about the political origins and
the deep structure of the Constitution Ac4 1867. It does not presume, any more than the
statute theory, that Aboriginal Canadians were not also a (if not the) founding people of the
country. Like the statute theory, which is equally unresponsive to Native claims, the compact
theory is advanced by its adherents only as an interpretive tool for understanding how
French/English relations were accommodated in the confederative Act. It is not propounded
as a prescriptive thesis for the future of the Canadian federation in order to deny the status
of founding people to other groups.
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addition of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) an overwhelming
majority of English speakers, and in exchange for giving up the
representational parity of Canada East with Canada West in the
Parliament of the United Canadas, French-speaking Canadians (the
overwhelming percentage of whom lived in the province of Canada
East) demanded the establishment of a federal, rather than a
legislative, union. Notwithstanding Macdonald's initial reluctance,
they insisted that substantial governmental powers be delegated to
at least one political unit where they would constitute the majority.
They also demanded institutional and linguistic guarantees at the
federal level in order to protect their position in the national
political process. Lastly, they saw in the powers of disallowance and
reservation, as well as in the Imperial connection generally, an
external assurance that the terms of the compact would be respected
in those political arenas where they comprised only a minority. This
decentralist and anti-statist view, not surprisingly, has in the past
been most frequently and successfully advanced by French-language
constitutional scholars in Quebec.
62
It bears emphasis that the compact in issue was not an
agreement between the government of Canadh East and that of
Canada West, or even between the United Canadas and the
Maritime Provinces. Rather, it was a compact between French and
English-speaking peoples. That the compact has come to be
understood as almost exclusively an arrangement between
governments is in part due to an evolution in the notion of the state
since 1867, and in part an unfortunate consequence of federal
policies between 1885 and 1925 which never differentiated "compact"
and "states rights" theories of federalism.63 That this latter version
62 See for example, P. Gdrin-Lajoie, Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1950); R. Rumilly, L'autonoinie provinciale, Montreal, Arbre,
1948; J.-C. Bonenfant, La naissance de la confedration, Montreal, Lmdac, 1969; G.
Rdmillard, Le fdralisme canadien: Tome , La loi constitutionnelle de 1867, Montreal,
Quebec/Amerique, 1983; and A. Tremblay, Les corpdtences idgislatives art Canada et les
pouvoirs provinciaLr en mnatrre de propritd ct de droits civils, Ottawa, Universitd d'Ottawa,
1967.
63 It is not without importance that the first exposition in Canada of the "states rights"
view of the compact occurred at the same time as the squabbles between Honor6 Mercier and
Sir John A. Macdonald concerning the scope of federal jurisdiction. See TJJ. Loranger,
Letters Upon the Interpretation of the Federal Constitution Known As the British North America
[VOL. 29 No. 2
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gained any currency at all outside Quebec is attributable to the
polemical success of Ontario Premiers Mowat in the 1880s and
Ferguson during the 1920s.64 As noted, in its original understanding,
the 1867 compact was understood to be between French-speaking
Canadians (principally Quebeckers, but in more modem versions of
the thesis, Acadians and Franco-Ontarians also) on the one hand,
and English-speaking Canadians (including English-speaking
Canadians in Quebec) on the other. Only after the Manitoba
Schools Question put the potential difference between the two
theories starkly before the federal government was the compact
thesis collapsed into nothing more than a linguistic states rights
thesis by English-language and most French-language constitutional
scholars, aided and abetted by statist-liberal politicians such as
Mowat, Mercier, and, although to a lesser extent, Laurier.
65
Political and legal theorists who adopt the compact thesis in
its original form point to several features of the Constitution Act,
Ac 1867 (Quebec: Printed at the "Morning Chronicle" Office, 1884); and P.B. Mignault,
Manuel de droit parlementaire ou cours elementaire de droit constitutionnel, Montreal, A.
Pdriard, 1889.
64 Ferguson, in particular, was reacting to the discussions that were to culminate in the
Statute of Westminster, 1931. Fearing that the federal government would obtain power to
unilaterally amend the constitution, he attempted to marshall other premiers into a united
front against Ottawa. Writing to the prime minister, Ferguson forcefully argued for the
requirement of provincial consent in any constitutional amendment given that the document
was fundamentally a treaty between provinces. Significant extracts of the letter and
memorandum are published in R.M. Dawson, Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-1931
(London: Oxford University Press, 1933) at 156.
65 Mowat and Mercier first articulated this "states rights" view at the interprovincial
conference of 1887. The resolutions adopted at this conference called for a modified
federalism with restrictive disallowance powers and consequent freer reign to the provinces
along the lines of the U.S. model. For a documentary record see Canada, Dominion
Provincial and Interprovincial Conferences from 1887 to 1926 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951)
at 15.
The most interesting change in perspective was that of Laurier. In his convocation
address to the McGill Law Class of 1864 he stated: "l' tude des lois a continu6 ce
rapprochement, nous nous sommes familiaris6s avec les jurisconsultes de ]a France et de
l'Angleterre nos m~res-patries; nous allions ensemble les g6nies de ces grandes nations."
Twenty-five years later he was to say the same thing at a St. Jean Baptiste day rally (see M.
Wade, The French Canadians, 1760-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1955) at 427-428. But, when
forced to choose between the racial and states-rights views of the compact during the election
of 1896, he chose the latter. For a brief summary of Laurier's electoral position see J.M.
Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall,
1968) at 72-85.
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1867 as examples of the kinds of special institutional arrangements
and legislative jurisdiction which were essential to securing the
assent of French-speaking Canadians to the Confederation
arrangement. These features include the preservation of the Civil
Law in Quebec by the adoption in section 92(13) of the Quebec Act,
1774 formula "property and civil rights" as the touchstone of
provincial jurisdiction; the exclusion of Quebec from section 94;
the special guarantees of section 98, section 133, and section 144;
the provision for a Legislative Council in Quebec under sections 71
et seq; the confirmation of Roman Catholic Schools in Upper
Canada by section 93; and shared provincial jurisdiction over
immigration under section 95. Compact theorists also point to these
provisions as evidence that, in the ensuing federal political state,
Quebec was expressly constituted to be a province unlike the others.
This further claim for special status for Quebec as a
Canadian province was not historically necessary to the pre-
Confederation "compact between two founding peoples" thesis, and
emerged only with the drafting of the Constitution Act, 1867. It
was, however, clearly present in the minds of the "Fathers of
Confederation."66 Current revisionist histories which point to the
Quebec Act, 1774 as confirmation of a similar intention to treat the
province of Quebec distinctively are clearly wrong (unless the claim
is reinterpreted in a non-federal context and is understood as being
that the Quebec Act, 1774 was designed to treat New France
differently from all other British colonies in North America,
including the thirteen colonies to the south). Moreover, neither
the Constitution Act, 1791 nor the Act of Union, 1840 were designed
to afford Lower Canada (and later Canada East) any special
legislative status. The concept of special status for a province only
makes sense in the context of a federal union. What these earlier
statutes did do, however, was to give recognition to French language
and culture, to the civil law, and to the Roman Catholic religion
within those parts of British North America formerly comprising
New France. To this extent they can be seen as precedents for the
6 6 See the impressive list of documentary sources assembled by Gdrin-Lajoie, supra, note
62 at App. C. See also the sources reviewed in Quebec, Report of the Royal Commission of
Inquiy on Constitutional Problems (Quebec City: Province of Quebec, 1956) [hereinafter
Tremblay Commission Report].
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unique institutional arrangements relating to Quebec which were
adopted in 1867.67
Now, whatever the corruption of the initial constitutional
reform agenda in 1987, and of the resulting Meech Lake Accord,
which was produced by the need to gain the assent of other
Canadian premiers, it is obvious that some version of the compact
theory underlies the original purposes being pursued in the
discussions which culminated in the Meech Lake Accord.68 The use
of the words "some version of the compact theory" is intentional.
While the main features of the Meech Lake Accord could be
understood as recognizing Canadian duality, they did so mainly
through political institutions and not through the promotion of
French and English language and culture per se. That is, the Meech
Lake Accord spoke principally to only one of the two
post-Confederation features of the traditional compact thesis. The
inclusion of a "distinct society" clause, the establishment of the
special process for nominating Supreme Court justices trained in the
civil law, and the incorporation of amendments relating to the
spending power and to immigration that would likely be deployed
only by Quebec, are evidence that the Meech Lake Accord
responded to the constructive or constitutive jurisdictional elements
of the compact. But, except to the extent that the hortatory terms
of sections 2(1)(a) and 2(2) stated an ambition, the Meech Lake
Accord did not address directly the constraining features on
government action initially worked out for the protection of
67 The point is that, in their haste to make the case for "special status" for Quebec, these
commentators forget the transformative effect of the Constitution Ac4 1867. No doubt, the
division of Upper and Lower Canada in 1791 and the union in 1840 both were undertaken
for reasons relating to "race." But the notion of special status itself is a post-Confederation
concept. See Tremblay Commission Report, ibid Part I at 5-182.
68 Even the process leading up to the Meech Lake Accord reflects this point. For after
Quebec announced its "five conditions," the Prime Minister was able to get the assent of other
provincial premiers (i) to negotiate with Quebec on these questions, and (ii) to restrict this
first round of constitutional negotiations to Quebec's conditions. Whatever the final form,
then, it is reasonably clear that in substance the Meech Lake Accord process began as a
negotiation between Quebec and the rest of the country. And this response to Quebec's sense
of being "left out" of the 1982 agreement can only be grounded in a belief that Quebec had
some special claim to be included. For a brief discussion of the discussions leading up to the
meeting at Meech Lake see Hogg, supra, note 7.
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non-Quebec Francophones.69 Indeed, the maligned Charter was just
as important a reflection of this pan-Canadian aspect of the compact
thesis as the Meech Lake Accord itself.
One might justifiably say, therefore, that in their predominant
themes, the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Meech Lake Accord each
reflect a partial view of the two hundred year history of Canada,
and of its expression in the Confederation exercise - a partial view,
which in each case responded primarily to only one of the two
principal interpretations of the Constitution Act, 1867 that had
intellectual currency over the past century. Once again, it bears
reiteration that other early adherents to the Canadian Confederation
- New Brunswick and Nova Scotia in 1867, Manitoba in 1870,
British Columbia in 1871, and Prince Edward Island in 1873 - may
well have had their own special reasons for joining the union.
Seeking a guarantee of bilingualism for at least a part of the
North-West Territories, negotiating a transcontinental railway,
expelling non-resident landowners, and avoiding governmental
bankruptcy, were each among the purposes pursued by colonies
which at one time or another joined Canada after 1867.70 But the
point is that the view of the Constitution Act, 1867 reflected by
non-linguistic "states rights" rhetoric has not received extensive
scholarly support, either in the Maritimes, or from other early
adherents to the Canadian Confederation. Indeed, apart from a
flourish in Ontario between 1885 and the 1930s, it did not figure
prominently in constitutional theory until the 1970s. This may have
been because the geographic organization of Canadian federalism,
for its first few decades, was predominantly one of regionalism,
rather than provincialism; or it may have been that, because
Quebec was so closely associated with promoting the compact
69 See, for suggestions to this effect, K. McRoberts, 'The Case for Meech Lake,"
(December 1987) The Canadian Forwn at 12-13.
70 For a discussion of the mainly economic reasons that led Prince Edward Island to join
after over fifteen years of resistance, see Waite, supra, note 54 at 179; with respect to Nova
Scotia, see Waite, ibid. at 193, and to New Brunswick, at 229. For a history of the entrance
of Manitoba into Confederation, see G.F.G. Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada: A Histoy
of the Piel Rebellions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961).
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interpretation, the question of language and culture dominated the
framing of the theory.
71
Time will tell whether the contemporary revendications of
the provinces later adhering to the Confederation, such as Alberta
and Newfoundland, will mature into a full-blown "states-rights" thesis
about Confederation of the type implicit in the doctrines of South
Carolina's J.C. Calhoun.7 Time will also tell whether the
concessions to provincialism in Parts III, IV, and V of the
Constitution Act, 1982, dealing with equalization, constitutional
conferences, and the amending formula, respectively, as well as those
of the Meech Lake Accord dealing with opting out, Supreme Court
nominations, and immigration, will lead to the dominance of
"states-rights" interpretations in future assessments of the
constitutional reforms (and proposed reforms) of the 1980s.73  Be
that as it may, the legislative fiat (national centrist) and the compact
(French and English founding peoples) theses have been the main
starting points for constitutional argument about the meaning of the
Constitution Act, 1867, about the earlier institutional arrangements
from which modern Canada emerged, and about the political and
historical legitimacy of the patriation and Meech Lake Accord
processes.
If each of these two dominant interpretative theses presents
only a partial view of Canada's constitutional foundations and
subsequent constitutional history, it is clear that neither satisfactorily
captures the overall spirit of Confederation. There are some aspects
of the Constitution Act, 1867 which simply cannot be explained by
reference to the statute thesis. Similarly, there are other parts of
71 The history of these various conceptions of decentralist federalism are reviewed in
detail in Black, supra, note 11, c. 5, 6, & 7. It is to be noted, however, that, at 149-171, Black
uses the expression "compact theory" to describe what I have characterized in the text as the
"states rights" thesis.
72 Calhoun was the most vocal proponent of the "states-rights" doctrine in the United
States in the pre-Civil War period. For a compendium of his views see R.K. Cralle, ed., The
Works of John C. Calhoun, vols 1-6 (New York: D. Appleton, 1851-56), and for a detailed
presentation of his "compact" theory of the American federal union see his Disquisition of
Government, reproduced therein.
73 For an indication that such a perspective may well be gaining ascendency in certain
quarters see the papers in Gibbins, ed., Perspectives From the West, supra, note 32, especially
those at 13-62.
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the Act for which the compact theory cannot provide a plausible
account. But like the particle and wave theories of light, each does
seem to render accurately a part of the total phenomenon, and, in
combination, both explain most of the relevant data. That physicists
have been unable to postulate a unified theory of light, and can
tolerate the irreconcilability of their two main governing theses,
suggests that Canadian constitutional scholars would not necessarily
be wrong to acknowledge the tension, so far irreconcilable, between
compact and statute interpretations of Confederation. The
experience of physicists also argues that it is preferable for the
judiciary to act to maintain a province for each as a vehicle for
explaining Canada's constitutional arrangements, rather than for it to
approach its interpretive task as if consistency demanded that one
thesis ultimately had to vanquish the other. Lastly, the lesson of the
coexistence of particle and wave theories of light teaches that, in
principle, modern constitutional artifacts such as Charters of Rights
and Freedoms should not be designed with an imperialistic or
unifying goal in view, and should not seek finally to resolve
fundamental interpretive tensions in one way or the other.74
This last observation has particular significance today given
the predominance which a highly individualistic view of the Charter
seems to be attaining,75 and given important changes to the dynamic
of constitutional scholarship only recently emerging. The latter
point requires more detailed development. One of the fascinating
paradoxes of recent Canadian public law scholarship is the reversal
in intellectual perception between a number of English and
French-speaking commentators as to the significance of the statute
74 1 have argued in another place that, notwithstanding the limited vision of contemporary
Charter patriotism, the 1982 Charter is capable of such a pluralist interpretation, and that it
was probably designed to be so interpreted. See Macdonald, Postscript and Prelude, supra,
note 14.
75 See, for examples of the exaggerated individualism of much Charter commentary, the
sources criticized in Mandel, supra, note 30. The current fascination with repealing section
33 also reflects this truncated understanding of the Charter. For a thoughtful defence of
section 33, and the broader understanding of rights which it implies, see L.E. Weinrib,
"Learning to Live with the Override" (1990) 35 McGill L.J. 541. A further development of
this theme is presented in Professor Weinrib's carefully constructed understanding of section
1 in "The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter" (1988) 10 Sup. Ct L.
Rev. 469.
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and compact theses. For example, some essentially nationalist
French-speaking jurists in Quebec are now saying that Confederation
was just another step towards responsible government and decol-
onialization, and that federalism is, under the Constitution Act, 1867,
merely a statutory allocation of power and jurisdiction between
levels of government.76 A federal structure was simply a convenient
administrative arrangement given the vast geography of the new
country being established, the need for a common defence policy,
the imperatives of economic development, and the competition for
commercial dominance between established Montreal and upstart
Toronto.
The consequences of this claim are then developed as
follows. Now that the Quebec government requires more legislative
jurisdiction in order to respond adequately to the challenges it faces
in the late twentieth century, the former allocation should be
updated. That the new province of Quebec, alone among the four
initial provinces, should have had a majority of French-speaking
citizens was merely an accident of history and territorial convenience
dating back to the Constitutional Act, 1791. The establishment of
Quebec as a province did not primarily result from a peoples'
compact between a French-speaking minority and an English-
speaking majority to build a Canadian nation. More to the point,
it certainly did not reflect any implied compact, binding the Quebec
government to protect its own English-speaking minority. Further,
that Quebec should have been recognized as a province not like the
others (a point some new French-speaking constitutional theorists
are even prepared to deny) reflected nothing other than the legal
and economic realpolitik of the times. Notwithstanding the military
threat from the United States, Confederation had no ideological
overtones, and in no way committed any colony to the creation of
an indissoluble country. On this view, equally as statist as its
English-language analogue, should the Quebec government now find
it necessary to promote the French language at the expense of the
English, there is neither a constitutional nor a moral impediment to
its doing so; and should the Quebec government find it preferable
76 Ibis sub-text is evident in, for example, C. Dufour, Le d6fi Qudbdcois: Essai, Montreal,
Hexagone, 1989, and in P. Fournier, A Meech Lake Post-Mortem (Montreal: McGill-Queens
University Press, 1991).
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to accede to full sovereignty, it is only "natural" (a favourite
expression of contemporary Quebec historical determinists) that it
should be permitted to do so.
By contrast, a number of English-speaking constitutional
commentators are now groping toward the language of compact as
a means of explaining the place of English-speaking Quebeckers in
Confederation. 77 These scholars suggest that many aspects of the
various pre-Confederation Imperial statutes can be best understood
as reflecting a carefully considered compromise between the claims
of the conquered habitants and the later arriving United Empire
Loyalists. They argue that the Constitution Act, 1867 in particular
gave legislative form to a political arrangement between English and
French-speaking minorities in the United Canadas. But, while
acknowledging the primary compact which produced the federal
arrangement, the political accommodation these theorists emphasize
is that between the English-speaking minority and the
French-speaking majority in Canada East. On this view, sections 10
and 11 of the Quebec Act, 1774 (which instituted freedom of willing
and trial by jury) as much as section 8 (which re-established the
Civil Law) were the initial proof of the intention of the British
Colonial Office to accomodate cultural and linguistic trade-offs.
Hence the assertion that the only reason that the English-speaking
population of what is now Quebec agreed to a federal union, rather
than a continuation in a modified form of the 1840 legislative union,
was that the Constitution Act, 1867 offered significant constitutional
guarantees on those matters which were of greatest concern to it.78
These guarantees, just like those provided to the French-
speaking minority at the national level, were of three sorts: positive,
Some of these commentators also see in the compact metaphor a justification for
promoting Aboriginal claims, and those of French-speaking Canadians in provinces other than
Quebec.
78 The most persuasive proponent of this view was Sir AT. Gait, who, coincidentally,
was the first high-profile advocate of federalism. See A.T. Gait, Speech on the Proposed
Union of die British North Amcrican Provinces (Montreal: Longmoore, 1864). In this speech
Galt defended a highly centralist view of federation which would protect the interests of
English-speaking inhabitants of Lower Canada. Apart from D'Arcy McGee, no prominent
English-speaking politicians supported any form of decentralized federation. Indeed, Liberals
such as Luther Holton, and independent Conservatives such as Christopher Dunkin, vigorously
opposed all federalist proposals. For a brief history see Waite, supra, note 54, at 134-160.
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or jurisdictional; negative, or in the nature of entrenched rights;
and supervisory, or appellate. Thus, certain matters which might
normally be thought to fall within the ambit of provincial legislative
competence were transferred to the jurisdiction of the federal
Parliament; second, important limitations favouring the rights of
English-speaking Quebeckers were placed on the authority of the
Quebec legislature; and third, the exercise of certain powers was
made subject to external political, as well as legal, control.
Jurisdictional guarantees of the first type, it is said, can be found in
relation to federal legislative authority over marriage and divorce
(subsection 91(26)). This guarantee was intended to ensure that
Roman Catholic canon law would not be legislated on Protestant
sects in Quebec. Moreover, to protect Montreal's English-
dominated commercial interests, extensive federal jurisdiction was
established over commerce - whether of an intra or interprovincial
character (sub-sections 91(2) and 91(9)-(23), and 92(10) by
exclusion). Again, so as to offer partial protection to English-
speaking Eastern townships farmers, a shared federal jurisdiction
over agriculture (section 95), and guaranteed cantonal representation
in the Senate (section 22(6)) was provided. Finally, federal control
over the appointment of the senior judiciary (section 96) was
understood as a vehicle for insulating the judicial process from
undue provincial political influence.
Non-jurisdictional guarantees of the second type are held to
be found in the provisions for a legislative upper house only in
Quebec (sections 71-79), for the protected representation of certain
districts in the legislative assembly (section 80), for language rights
in courts and the legislature (section 133), and for the preservation
of sectarian school boards (section 93). Supervisory guarantees are
seen to reside in the institution of appeals in school matters directly
to the Governor General (section 93), and most importantly, for
the federal disallowance power (section 60). This three-fold
inventory, it is claimed, constitutes direct evidence that the
confederative Constitution Act, 1867 was grounded, at least in part,
in a notion of compact, and that the protection of the English-
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speaking minority in Quebec was a fundamental part of that
compact.79
Lying behind the invocation of these two conventional
interpretations of the Constitution Act, 1867 by new scholarly
constituencies are present political realities. After all, metaphors
typically are found and deployed for rhetorical purposes. In the fall
of 1989, for example, Canadians witnessed a televised debate
between Gordon Robertson, former Secretary to the Cabinet and
Clerk of the Privy Council in Ottawa, and Claude Morin, former
Parti Qu6b6cois Minister and architect of that party's referendum
strategy. In this debate, the former invoked a variant of the
compact theory in defence of the Meech Lake Accord, and the latter
invoked the statute theory in defence of Quebec's right of unilateral
secession. Neither would acknowledge the partiality of the
metaphor being deployed in support of his own position.
A similar strategic invocation is practiced by those
contemporary theorists in both English and French-language
communities who concede that there is some merit in each theory
of Confederation, but who attempt to marry the two interpretations
of the Constitution Act, 1867 by invoking the compact theory only
as a gloss on the statute theory. Their motive, scarcely concealed,
is to provide a justification for the post-patriation constitutional
status quo. Today, an important strand of English-language
constitutional scholarship and Parliamentary opinion - still
preoccupied with nation-building on the u.s. model and especially
sensitive to the centrifugal tendencies of Quebec separatism and of
Western alienation - holds that the whole compact (if indeed there
ever was one) was spelled out by the Constitution Act, 1867. There
is, therefore, no residual concept of "distinct society" which is
79Until recently, it was a favorite theme of English-speaking constitutional lawyers to
argue for increased centralization. See, notably, the works of F.R. Scott collected in Essays
on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1977). This was no doubt in part because the English-speaking community never really
saw the Quebec government as its political agent, and because it never believed (or wanted
to believe) that the provincial government could overcome Quebec's traditional anti-statist
politics. Only in recent years, after the Quiet Revolution and with the perception that the
English-speaking community was indeed a minority, were arguments about the need for special
guarantees, such as those made by Dunkin and Holton, resurrected. For a contemporary
expression of this viewpoint see R. Scowen, A Different Vision: The English in Quebec in tie
1990s (London: Max'well and Macmillan, 1990).
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definitive of Quebec's place in Canada, or which can be invoked at
the constitutional bargaining table to revise the specific terms of the
initial compact.
Many contemporary French-language constitutional scholars
and members of the National Assembly in Quebec - preoccupied
with preserving the French language and culture in the one province
where it is majoritarian - respond similarly to compact-based
arguments from English-speaking Quebeckers. They maintain that,
even if there were some agreement between the English-speaking
minority in Quebec and the French-speaking majority, the complete
terms of that covenant were spelled out precisely in the Constitution
Act, 1867. There are, therefore, no other (implied) terms which can
be negotiated at the constitutional bargaining table. What is common
to these two modern mixed theories is the claim that whatever
importance the notion of compact between founding peoples may
have had in the design of the Constitution Act, 1867, it no longer
has, or ought to have, any relevance to constitutional practice and
interpretation. Metaphorically, one might say that the compact
theory may perhaps constitute a meaningful device for the
interpretation of Canada's pre-contractual negotiations, but since
Confederation the operative principle of the Constitution Act, 1867
has been pacta sunt semanda.
Neither of these modern variations on the statute theory
comes any closer to capturing the whole meaning of Confederation
than their pristine progenitors, even though they have attracted the
allegiance of several key political figures. Without a doubt the most
persistent and articulate proponent of this type of constitutional
analysis is Pierre Trudeau.80 On the one hand, he implicitly uses
the language of compact to justify the language guarantees of the
Charter, the federal Official Languages Act,8 1 and the bilingualization
of the federal government; on the other hand, he uses the language
of statute to resist claims by the government of Quebec to special
status. In both cases, sustaining the claim that Quebec needs no
new special powers, is the assumption of a "binding arrangement" in
80 See Johnston, supra, note 23. See also, P.E. Trudeau, "Say Goodbye to the Dream
of One Canada," The Toronto Star (27 May 1987) Al & A12.
81 R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-3.
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1867. The moral force of his argument, which was picked up in
both the Newfoundland and Manitoba Reports,82 lies in its
recognition that the concomitant of treating Quebec as a province
just like the others necessarily is a commitment to bilingualism at
the federal level (and provincially in those provinces where numbers
warrant).
Those who take this view have a defensible position as to
the implications of Confederation relating to the obligations of the
federal government, as the government of all French-speaking
Canadians whatever their province of residence. However, this
position understates the distinctiveness of the Province of Quebec
contemplated by the specific provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867,
and the role it felt that it was to play in the larger federation.8 3 It
is also a dangerous view of Confederation because it leaves open, if
not actually invites, the obverse possibility. This possibility, often
argued by opponents of the Meech Lake Accord, is that the language
of compact justifies a distinct French-speaking Quebec, while the
language of statute justifies English-speaking unilingualism in the
rest of the country. For these reasons, an interpretive position
according full and complete faith to both theses about the nature of
the Constitution Act, 1867 - statute and compact - in which neither
is seen as subordinate to the other, must drive the understanding of
the confederative agreement, and of Canada's living constitution
today.
Moreover, when the Constitution Act, 1867 is viewed equally
through the lens of statute theory and compact theory much of
Canada's post-1960 political and constitutional malaise acquires a
new and richer meaning. In particular, what emerges from such an
approach to the several agenda of contemporary constitutional
amendment exercises - from the Victoria Charter through to the
Meech Lake Accord - is the realization that they have been shaped
82 See s pra, note 13.
83 As examples of this perceived role, one could cite the views of the Quebec government
in respect of the prosecution and hanging of Louis Riel, the suppression of the teaching of
French in Manitoba and Ontario, and the enactment of An Act to atthorize school
comnissions to make contributions from their funds for patriotic, national or school purposes,
S.Q. 6 Geo. 5 (1916), c. 23, s.1, by which the Quebec legislature undertook to assist in the
financing of patriotic, national, or scholarly endeavours, in Quebec or elsewhere.
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by one overriding concern. The concern is that the kinds of
political arrangements which the weaker of the two parties to the
initial confederative compact (and especially French-speaking
Canadians in Quebec) thought adequate to protect its interests in
1867 have proved to be insufficient one hundred years later. This
parenthetical assertion, of course, does imply that French-speaking
Canadians outside Quebec have not been important actors in recent
constitutional discourse, and that they too have reason to feel that
the arrangements put into place on their behalf are now
unsatisfactory. But dissatisfaction with the terms of Confederation
has been especially acute among French-speaking inhabitants of
Quebec, and by ricochet, among the province's English-speaking
minority. Interestingly, this feeling of the insufficiency of linguistic
and cultural guarantees calls forth claims for exactly opposite
constitutional remedies: French-speaking provincial political leaders
in Quebec typically seek more positive or "constitutive" jurisdiction
for the province; while English-speaking provincial political leaders
in Quebec typically seek more negative or limiting "side constraints,"
like Charters of Rights, on even existing provincial jurisduction.
Why is the constituted jurisdiction of the National Assembly
of Quebec believed by French-speaking provincial political elites to
be insufficient? Why should a variant of the "states-rights" view of
the original compact have come to predominate? To answer these
questions requires examining the specific jurisdiction actually claimed
by Quebec. It is notorious that, for forty years in Quebec,
provincial politicians of all persuasions have sought to expand
section 92 legislative jurisdiction over matters such as trade,
telecommunications, pensions, financial institutions, and immigration.
They have also claimed the need to enlarge the jurisdictional
competence of provincial courts and administrative tribunals, and to
gain greater input into decisions about the federal judicature (both
in relation to the Supreme Court and appointments to provincially
constituted section 96 courts). The five proposals presented by
Quebec's Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Gil Remillard, in
May 1986 which led to the Meech Lake Accord are only the latest
example of the Quebec government's "non-negotiable minimum
jurisdictional requirements" for preserving and enhancing the
national identity of the peuple qudbdcois.
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Before this idea of enhanced provincial jurisdiction is
developed, it is important to note how the concept of two founding
peoples and the labels by which each is identified have evolved since
Confederation, and especially since 1960. The present conflation of
people with territorial state has meant that one of the founding
peoples of Canada - le peuple canadien - has now become, at least
in the eyes of the government of Quebec, le peuple qudbdcois. In
1867, when English-speaking Canadians called themselves British
subjects, French-speaking Canadians were simply canadiens. With
the rise of Canadian nationalism following World War I, British
subjects became English-speaking Canadians, or Canadians, and the
canadiens became canadiens-francais. The crusade over the past
thirty years for unhyphenated Canadianism has led to a self-
recharacterization of canadien-francais as qudb6cois and the
concomitant labelling marginalization of fiancophones hors Quebec
and English-speaking Quebeckers. The increasing identification of
French-speaking Canadians as qudb6cois is also a reflection of
statism spawned by the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, under which all
residents of Quebec - including English-speaking residents - must
become quibicois if they are to be true Quebeckers. It is also a
reflection of the relative unimportance of French-speaking
non-residents of Quebec to the politics of Ottawa-Quebec
intergovernmental negotiations on jurisdictional and other
constitutional questions that they can no longer call themselves
canadien-francais (in parallel to canadien-anglais) but must be
content with the label francophones hors Quebec. The upshot of
this re-labelling is that twice since 1867, English-speaking Canadians
have appropriated the term by which French-speaking Canadians
identified themselves, and compelled the latter to redefine their
appartenance
8 4
To return to the principal point, there are a number of
reasons why the Quebec government should now see the scope of
its jurisdiction as the central element of the Confederation compact.
History teaches that once political states are constituted, peoples,
84 For this reason it does not lie well in the mouths of English-speaking Canadians to
accuse French-speaking Canadians in Quebec of disloyalty when they identify themselves as
Qu6b6cois. The theme of group labelling, and its impact on identity will be developed in
detail in the next two sections of this essay.
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as a sociological fact, generally tend to drop out of the constitutional
equation - to be replaced with the notion of a people as a political
fact. This is most apparent in the way that members of legislative
bodies conceive of their representative role. While pre-Con-
federation discourse in the United Canadas was between individual
members of Parliament arguing about the claims of their respective
linguistic constituencies, after 1867, constitutional negotiation about
language rights was being conducted primarily between governments.
After a century of relative quiescence, the role of French-speaking
members of Parliament from Quebec constituencies has, since the
1960s, increasingly been constitutive of national political debate and
federal policy on questions of language. Unfortunately, however,
the role of English-speaking members of the National Assembly in
Quebec City has, after the Quiet Revolution and the rise of cultural
statism at the provincial level, become largely formal and not, as
previously, constitutive. The former explains why French-speaking
Quebec MPs are often perceived, wrongly, outside Ottawa as mere
delegates of Quebec City. The latter tends to explain why it is the
voice of the Quebec government, and not that of the political
representatives of French-speaking Canadians wherever their location
in the country, which has been heard most loudly across the country
in relation to language and culture. Thus, the anguished cry from
those of good will who seek to understand questions of language
rights has become not "what can be done to enhance the French
language and culture in Canada?" or even "what do French-
Canadians want?" but rather "what does Quebec want?"
This perception of contemporary language politics as an
intergovernmental affair between Ottawa and Quebec also arises
because of the changing dynamic of federal/provincial relations
generally. At the same time that the growth of Quebec nationalism
was fuelling the engines of statism during the Quiet Revolution,
other provinces - notably Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia -
began to escape their subservience to Ottawa in matters of policy
and to assert claims for increased jurisdiction over resources and
more taxation powers to sustain the emerging welfare state. For the
first time, strong provincial rights movements emerged across the
country and the various strands of Canadian federalism -
regionalism, linguistic dualism, and equalization - came to be
collapsed into a single axis of federal/provincial relations. In such a
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context it is not surprising that the Quebec government should be
seen as the key French-language player in Canadian linguistic
politics.
85
The second reason for the intergovernmental focus of
language rights claims can be traced to the interplay of Quebec
nationalism and its changing socio-economic dimensions. The end
of anti-statism, rapid urbanization, the rise of a middle class, and the
decline of the Roman Catholic church were important features lying
behind Quebec's constitutional proposals. Given the contemporary
role of the state, the Quebec government constantly asserts that an
expanded legislative jurisdiction is necessary in order for it to protect
French language and culture - be this in Quebec or elsewhere.
Much of this jurisdiction, however, falls within subject-matters about
which the power to legislate initially was assigned to the federal
Parliament, or with respect to which the federal government has
substantially deployed the spending power. Whether Ottawa has
done a good job at the economic, cultural, and linguistic
enhancement of French-speaking Canadians with these powers - as
in the case of the Canada Council, Radio Canada, the Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, and the
National Film Board - or has, arguably, not - as in the case of
transportation policy, immigration, tertiary education, and research
and development - their allocation for the future is constantly on
the negotiating table between Ottawa and Quebec City.
8 6
There is still another reason that Canadian language politics
are seen as predominantly driven by the Quebec government. Many
Canadians outside Quebec have their primary contact with the
85 Apart from New Brunswick, and more recently Ontario, governments in English
dominated provinces of Canada have used language politics as a vehicle for asserting provincial
claims. Rather than recognize a responsibility to their own linguistic minority, they have used
autonomy as an excuse to resist federalism language policies. Even Quebec has adopted this
intergovernmental perspective in its legal briefs against French-language educational rights in
Alberta.
86 One of the most important, yet overlooked, reasons for the recent predominance of
intergovernmental conflict was the decline in the status and authority of the Roman Catholic
Church. As long as the Church was perceived as the principal defender of language and
cultural rights, these revendications had no territorial limitations, and their negotiation took
place between two different orders of social institution. For a development of this theme
see Breton & Breton, supra, note 11.
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French fact in Canada as a consequence of federal politicians -
many of whom, such as Trudeau, Marchand, P6pin, Chrrtien, and
Lalonde, sponsored economic initiatives unpopular especially in the
West - as a consequence of federal language policy - bilingual
cereal boxes, bilingual signs in National Parks, bilingual
announcements in airport and train stations. But they attribute
these economic initiatives to the demands of the Quebec
government acting on behalf of French-speaking Quebeckers, and
not to the imperatives of national government. Similarly, they
attribute these language policies to the unfair dominance of Quebec
mps in the national Liberal Party governments, and not to the
legitimate expectations of all French-speaking Canadians, wherever
their province of residence. Hence, both within and outside
Quebec, modem language politics is usually misunderstood as being
exclusively about, and fundamentally the result of, federal/provincial
jurisdictional squabbles.
8 7
To put the point slightly differently, the Constitution Act,
1867 constituted un 6tat qudbdcois, in which French-Catholic culture
could find its initial political expression. The French-speaking
population was, for the first time since 1763, not either in a position
of political powerlessness (as was all non-elite and non-British
culture in the "pre-responsible government" era up until circa 1841),
or in a more or less minority position within governmental
institutions of the early "responsible government" period (as was the
case from 1841 through 1867). That this 6tat should have come to
see itself as the French-speaking state within Canada was inevitable
as long as Quebec remained both the only province with a
French-speaking majority, and a predominantly French-speaking
province. That its political elites should come to conflate the
interests of all French-speaking Canadians with those of Quebec,
and more generally with the scope of provincial legislative
jurisdiction - trading off the former against the latter whenever they
87 This failure to distinguish between federal and provincial governments drives the
association of revisions to the Official Languages Act, with the "distinct society" clause, with
Bill 178, and with the awarding of the CF-18 contract to Canadair in Montreal rather than
Bristol Aerospace in Winnipeg. Each of these events resulted from a separate political logic
and a separate political process; yet all are lumped together as evidence of how French-
Canadians in Quebec wield disproportionate power in Canada.
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conflicted - is a predictable consequence of establishing a federal
system comprising discrete territorial units.88  Finally, that the
Quebec government should seek greater and greater legislative
jurisdiction for the National Assembly in this self-constitution of
l'dtat quibdcois is merely a corollary of twentieth century concepts
of l'dtat providence. For these various reasons it is understandable
how the initial conception of a Confederation compact between "two
founding peoples" should have become transformed in the eyes of
the country's political elites into an agreement between states; and
it is also understandable how the idea of an agreement between
states should come to be understood in Quebec as an agreement
between the state of French-speaking Canadians (Quebec) and the
state of English-speaking Canadians (the federal government).
Given these transformations, one can appreciate why at least shared
jurisdiction over certain powers allocated exclusively to the federal
government by the Constitution Act, 1867 should now be seen by
the provincial political leadership as necessary to permit the
government of Quebec to fulfill in 1991 its "historically mandated"
role.
But the other linguistic group in Quebec - since 1867
constitutionally (along with Francophones outside Quebec) Canada's
only true minority in the sense that it possesses no state to generate
its own legal institutions - has also come to feel that the agreement
reached in 1867 is incomplete and unsatisfactory. No doubt, there
is much truth in characterizing Quebec's English-speaking minority
as Canada's "best treated." For the neglect of the special needs of
Franco-Ontarians and Acadians in the 1867 negotiations, and the
fact that it required the Riel revolt of 1870 to generate recognition
of these needs in Manitoba, are travesties for which the country has
long suffered. Nevertheless, it is also true that English-speaking
Quebeckers have reason to regret the arrangements to which their
ancestors agreed in 1867. The original Confederation compact
presupposed plenary provincial powers in section 92 matters, and at
88 How different the situation would now be had the federating principle been that of
a personal jurisdiction defined by language and culture (regardless of geographic location).
For a discussion of this and other variant forms of federalism, and the political institutions
which they would imply, see J.A. LaPonce, Langue et territoire, Quebec, Presses de l'Universit6
Laval, 1984.
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the same time provided significant protection for the
English-speaking community of Quebec in several fields which
normally would be thought to fall within the realm of "matters of a
local or private nature." Yet apart from assigning these areas of
contentious jurisdiction to the federal Parliament, or prohibiting
Quebec legislative modification to the basic formal incidents of
governments (representation in the Assembly, the language of courts
and legislatures, and education), very little attention was paid to
erecting general negative barriers such as those associated with bills
of rights against provincial government action. The federal
disallowance power and educational appeals to the Governor-
General, it was believed, would accomplish, just as effectively, the
same goals that more detailed judicially enforced side constraints on
government action had provided elsewhere. However, because the
disallowance and executive appellate powers have now fallen into
disuse, over the past fifteen years the English-speaking minority in
Quebec, like French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec,89 has
increasingly sought judicial, rather than political, enforcement of its
perceived rights under the Confederation compact.90 Put slightly
differently, the failure to secure group rights in the political arena
has generated an increasing recourse to claims of individual right
such as those promoted by the Charter in judicial forums. For
English-speaking Quebeckers, the initial Confederation founding
peoples' compact, or "collectivities agreement," has thus been
transformed into a series of separate citizen-state compacts, or
"individual social contracts."
89 See, for example, A.G. Manitoba v. Forest, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1032 [hereinafter Forest];
Bilodeau v. A.G. Manitoba, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; R v. Mercure, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234
[hereinafter Mercure]; Socidtd des Acadiens du Nouveau-Bnutswick v. Assn of Parents, [1986]
1 S.C.R. 549; and Mahd v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342.
90 For a history of the disallowance power see G.V. La Forest, Disallowance and
Reservation of Provincial Legislation (Ottawa: Canada Department of Justice, 1965). The
power has not been used since 1943, and despite claims by some (for example, E.A. Forsey,
Freedom and Order (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974) at 167-171) that it should be
resurrected to protect civil liberties, it is probably spent. See the discussion in Re Resolution
to Amend the Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 802. For examples of litigation
to enforce language and educational guarantees see A.G. Quebec v. Blaikie, [19791 2 S.C.R.
1016; Chaussure Brown, supra, note 14; Devine v. A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790; Quebec
Assn of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Quebec, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66; and Forget v. A.G.
Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 90.
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With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said confidently that
neither the French-speaking minority in Canada, nor the
English-speaking minority in Quebec, foresaw exactly what types of
constitutional arrangement would be necessary in order to protect
and advance its interests adequately in the twentieth century.
Indeed, neither minority could have predicted that the metaphor of
compact would have proved insufficient to arrest the constitutional
equivalent of Maine's dictum - the progression from a pre-Con-
federation social and communitarian relationship between peoples,
to a post-Confederation legal and institutional relationship between
government and government, and between citizen and government.
The constitutional concerns of French-speaking Quebeckers as
articulated by successive Quebec governments over the past fifty
years are, of course, fundamental to understanding the content of
the Meech Lake Accord. Yet it is noteworthy that, by contrast with
the concerns of French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec - which
are directed to positive acts of ill-treatment or conscious neglect by
provincial (and to a lesser degree, federal) governments - most
complaints emanating from Quebec (with the exceptions of the
imposition of conscription, the extensive deployment of the federal
spending power, and the patriation of the Constitution in 1982) are
not grievances about "oppressive" federal action. They are, rather,
grievances about inaction, disempowerment, or a failure to take the
special situation of French-speaking Canadians into account in
federal policy-making. 91 Until recently, the concerns of the English-
speaking minority in Quebec have not been widely publicized. This
has occurred mainly because, unlike the case with French-speaking
Canadians outside Quebec, it has not been necessary. But with a
loss of economic and political power comes a startling recognition of
minority status. Like Acadians, Franco-Ontarians, and Franco-
Manitobans, English-speaking Quebeckers now neither control, nor
have direct political influence over, any government apparatus.
Because this minority has no constitutionally recognized institution
to serve as its mouthpiece, its concerns are, consequently, not as
well understood as those of the French-speaking majority in Quebec.
91 The nature of these grievances, and the relationship of the Mecch Lake Accord to
them, will be discussed below, sections IV, V, and VI.
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One of the great paradoxes of Canada's contemporary
constitutional conundrum - a paradox revealed most starkly by
looking at the Constitution Act, 1867 through the lens of compact
theory - is that the root cause of the dissatisfaction of French and
English-speaking Quebeckers is identical. This cause is the different
socio-economic context which now prevails in Canada compared to
that which existed in 1867. In order to address the precise political
consequences flowing from this common cause, and the relationship
of the Meech Lake Accord to them, it is necessary to trace a brief
social history of Quebec over the past century. The Section
immediately following presents, first, a picture of Canada East on
the eve of Confederation. It then highlights some of the salient
socio-economic changes which have occurred in Quebec and links
these to various post-War legislative initiatives of the National
Assembly. This historical background to the institutional
arrangements of Confederation is useful for two other reasons. It
will help to show why many of the issues now contributing most to
the alienation of English and French-speaking Canadians from each
other may not have received explicit consideration in 1867. And it
will assist in explaining why the current grievances of the two
language communities in Quebec (and of the French-speaking
minorities outside Quebec) can neither be resolved in identical ways,
nor with identical fidelity to re-establishing the underlying terms of
the initial Confederation compact.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF CANADIAN LINGUISTIC
MINORITIES: CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORIES
If one were to return to 1867, one would encounter a
Quebec with a vastly different geography and ethnography than that
of today; in this Quebec, the English-speaking minority played a
dominant role.92 Apart from the towns of Quebec, Montreal, and
92 The synopsis set out in the following five paragraphs is drawn from standard accounts
of Canadian and Quebec sociology and history. In the present context, the best of these are
M. Rioux & Y. Martin, eds, French Canadian SocieVt, vol. 1 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1964) and M. Wade, supra, note 65. But compare, M. Brunet, 'The British Conquest:
Canadian Social Scientists and the Fate of the Canadiens' in Cook, Brown, & Berger, eds,
supra, note 55 at 84, who contests even some of the data reported by English-Canadian
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Sherbrooke, the province was sparsely populated, and had an almost
exclusively agricultural economy, buttressed in the winter months by
forestry and trapping. Geographically, the province comprised only
the St. Lawrence basin; most of its current territory (what is now
called Nouveau-Quebec) was under the administration of the
Hudson's Bay Company. The city of Quebec was still the major
governmental centre for the United Canadas, and had a substantial
English-speaking population; it remained the site of the Governor-
General's summer residence. Montreal itself was half English-
speaking, and within the province generally about one-third of the
population was non-Francophone. Much of what is today known as
the Eastern Townships, the South Gasp6, the Lower North Shore,
and the upper Ottawa river was initially settled by English-speaking
farmers, loggers, and fishermen.
Almost all Lower and Upper Canadian industry and finance,
including banks, railway, canals, shipping, trading, and manufacturing,
were based in Montreal. These mercantile operations were
conducted predominantly (if not exclusively) in English. Many
Montreal merchants, it will be recalled, signed a manifesto urging
annexation by States in the late 1840s, and only reluctantly accepted
the placement of the City of Montreal in the Province of Quebec
in 1867. The English-speaking community, through its long-standing
Royal Institution for the Advancement of Learning, organized and
financed its own primary and secondary schools. The Anglican and
Presbyterian churches initially sponsored Bishop's and McGill
University respectively. These religious organizations also estab-
lished orphanages, poor houses, and hospitals. The equivalent
educational and social institutions for French-speaking Canadians,
and English-speaking Irish Catholics, were run by the Roman
Catholic church, and not by any government.
From the perspective of the late twentieth century, when
Toronto has clearly emerged as the centre of the Canadian
economic universe, it is hard to imagine either the powerful
dominance which Montreal initially exercised in industry, banking,
historians. See also, Sdguin, supra, note 11, for an alternative interpretation of the story here
summarized. For a careful examination of the different strands in English-Canadian
historiography, see C. Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English.Canadian
Historical Writing 1900-1970 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976).
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and finance, or even that this dominance lasted until well after
World War II. Thus, it was only in the mid-1950s that the Toronto
Stock Exchange first traded more value than the Montreal
Exchange. Again, it is estimated that as late as the 1940s, the vast
bulk of Canadian wealth was controlled by mostly English-speaking
families living in the "Golden Square Mile" district of Montreal.
Given its numbers, its economic clout, and its close association with
the pre-responsible government and early responsible government
levers of political power, it is not surprising that English-speaking
Quebec, and especially English-speaking Montreal, had such a large
influence on the Confederation arrangements.
93
For most of its first ninety post-Confederation years,
moreover, Quebec's English-speaking community was, in its private
affairs, largely a self-contained, self-reliant, and self-financing
minority which asked for, and received, few services other than
concessions and franchises from the provincial government. Yet, by
contrast with the situation of linguistic isolationism which developed
toward the turn of the century, during the initial twenty years
following Confederation the elites of the two linguistic communities
in Quebec interacted reasonably comfortably in the great
construction of public institutions within the province. After about
1885, however, the English-speaking community was consciously
excluded from many French-speaking circles and non-governmental
institutions, and French-speaking Canadians were usually welcomed
into the English-speaking commercial elite only if they assimilated.
Through much of the twentieth century, English and French-
speaking groups in Quebec largely pursued separate, but parallel,
interests (right down to their two Montreal hockey teams - the
Maroons and the Canadiens) with the English continuing to
predominate in finance, commerce, and industry. Only in
agricultural communities in the Eastern Townships, in the smaller
93 One of the most evocative pictures of this influence is painted by G. Blaine Baker in
"Law Practice and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Montreal: The Torrance-Morris
Firm, 1948-1968" in C. Wilton, ed., Lawyers and Business in Canada, 1830-1930 (Toronto:
Osgoode Society, 1990) at 45. See also, M. Taylor, Promoters, Patriots, and Partisans:
Historiography in Nineteenth-Century English Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1989). For further confirmation of the influence of this community, and its representatives
such as McGee, Gait, Dunkin, Holton, Huntingdon, one need only read the Confederation
debates in the Province of Canada. See, Waite, supra, note 54.
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mill-towns in the St. Lawrence valley, and in "high-brow" cultural
circles in Montreal and Quebec City, did the early pattern of mutual
tolerance and co-operative interaction generally persist.
In such a context, the minimalist governments of Taschereau
and Duplessis (with their low taxes - the lowest in Canada - their
welcoming attitude to out-of-province business investment, and their
hands-off policy towards English-language religious and educational
institutions) suited the interests of Quebec's English-speaking
community. The anti-statist and anti-interventionist provincial
government was preoccupied throughout most of the 1920s, 1930s,
and 1940s with local religious, cultural, and linguistic issues, rather
than with economic matters. Thus, little policy conflict developed
between the provincial government and the Montreal-centred
business elite (with which it maintained a cosy client relationship),
and until the post-War reconstruction initiatives of the late 1940s,
between the provincial government and the federal government.
Aside from its persecution of unpopular political and religious
minorities, the policies of the Union Nationale were even supported
in many English-speaking business circles, as attested by the fact
that, throughout this period, several important economic portfolios
in the Quebec government were filled by English-speaking members
of the provincial assembly.94  In brief, Hugh MacLennan's
characterization of the Two Solitudes95 accurately captured the social
situation between English and French-speaking urban communities
throughout the province during the first half of this century.
But the Quiet Revolution of the early 1960s radically altered
this laissez faire pattern of co-existence. 96 Relationships with both
the English-speaking community and the federal government became
strained. The "rattrappage" and "maitres chez nous" slogans
championed by the Lesage government signalled a break from those
assumptions about the role of government underlying the division of
94 See H.F. Quinn, The Union Nationale: A Study in Quebec Nationalism (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1963).
95 (Toronto: Collins, 1945).
96 For a general assessment of the influence of the "Quiet Revolution" on the dynamic
of relationships between French and English-speaking Quebeckers, see J.-L. Roy, Maitres chez
nous (Dix annees d'action francaise, 1917-1927), Montreal, Lemdac, 1968 and J.-L. Roy, Le
choix d'un pays: Le ddbat constitutionnel Qudbcc-Canada, 1960-1976, Ottawa, Lem6ac, 1978.
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legislative powers negotiated in 1867. These slogans also heralded
a changing social agenda for the constituted state of French-speaking
Canadians; henceforth, the provincial government would take an
active role in ensuring not just the economic and cultural survival,
but the flourishing, of French-speaking Canadians. Finally, with the
acceleration of various public policy trends which initially emerged
in the 1930s, the Quebec government found itself in need both of
more "tax room," and desirous of greater legislative authority over
the economy and social affairs. Four main points of contention
emerged in the legislative programme of the Lesage government.
First, at Confederation, the role of the government in
owning and managing the economy to the extent known today, and
especially with the policy instruments which are now predominant
- regulatory agency and nationalization - was inconceivable. That
regulation of the details of the work place such as collective
bargaining, workers compensation, pensions, unemployment
insurance, and work place safety would be a matter of direct
provincial governmental concern, was not contemplated by the
political representatives of the English-speaking minority. These
representatives, it will be remembered, arranged for most finance,
business, and commercial jurisdiction which was then thought
significant to be vested in the federal Parliament. In the 1960s and
1970s this market regulation progressed, as elsewhere in North
America, from economic and social matters to political regulation
through expropriation to create various Crown corporations, and
through controls over the language of corporate names, the language
of business, and commercial advertising, to give only a few examples.
It became increasingly apparent that the notion of language-
indifferent unregulated, or even government-aided, corporatism upon
which the 1867 division of powers was negotiated, was no longer
grounding provincial economic policies. If anything, the focus of
government regulation became socio-linguistic. By the mid-1970s,
the policy goal of state assistance to business was explicitly stated to
be the creation of a French-speaking entrepreneurial elite.
A second area of extensive provincial legislative involvement
not within the contemplation of the drafters of the Constitution Act,
1867 was a consequence of accelerating industrialization and
urbanization. These trends led to a breakdown of social support
systems, with an attendant demand in the second half of the
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twentieth century for standardized governmental services.
Notwithstanding the grant of jurisdiction over hospitals, asylums,
charities, and municipal corporations to the provinces under sections
92(7)-(9), it was assumed that this jurisdiction would be largely
supervisory and indirect, or exercised through grants-in-aid to local
agencies and institutions, rather than being direct, pervasive, and
centralized. In a local, agricultural economy the two linguistic
groups in Quebec were able to exist by and large independently of
each other on the day-to-day level without much conflict.
Moreover, the stability of farming communities was such that many
consumer and social services were locally generated, and cultural
artifacts were more or less folklorique. Just as importantly, those
social services not provided by municipalities were not offered by the
provincial government, but were the prerogative of the churches.
Except for Montreal, Quebec City, and Sherbrooke, towns and cities
tended to be linguistically either English or French-speaking with
local services provided in one or the other language only.
With urbanization and industrialization, it became common
for the provincial government to assume responsibility for regulating
land use, municipal services, water, power, transport, and police.
This pan-North American development meant that local control -
that is, for the English-language communities, English language
control - was gradually replaced by provincial control, exercised
through mainly French-speaking administrative agencies which
upgraded standards throughout most of the province by enacting
general "norms." Thus, the local autonomy of municipalities, which
insured for smaller English-speaking communities in the Eastern
Townships, the Gasp6, the Outaouais, the Lower North Shore,
Abitibi, and the Montreal region a measure of self-government, was
gradually transferred to Quebec City where the priorities of the
majority rightly dominated the political agenda.
Third, it was also beyond conception in 1867 that the
provincial legislature would be required to take an interventionist
and comprehensive role in relation to education. More to the point,
it was inconceivable that the province would claim the power to
enact regulations governing the language of instruction in primary
and secondary schools. As section 93 attests, the initial concern of
the English-speaking community was to protect sectarian control
over schools, on the assumption that if sectarian school boards were
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preserved, the content of the curriculum of, and the eligibility
criteria for admission to, local schools could be locally controlled.
This assumption was not ill-founded, since it was only after World
War II that Quebec even established a full-blown Ministry of
Education. That this Ministry should soon redesign secondary
education by creating a CEGEP system in part to make up for the
lack of French-language universities,97 and then compel the
Protestant school boards to adopt this system; that it should feel
obligated to restrict access to English-language education among
immigrants and French-speaking residents of Quebec; and that it
should be required to use federal transfer payments dispropor-
tionately to build up what was, until the early 1970s, a grossly
inadequate French-language university network; all would have been
unthinkable in 1867. Of course, control over nonsectarian aspects
of public education was also on the mind of those who negotiated
the Confederation deal. For evidence, one need look no further
than Schedule Four to the Constitution Act, 1867, by which the
Normal School, the University Permanent Fund, the Royal
Institution, and the Lower Canada Superior Education Fund were
deemed to be joint property of Ontario and Quebec. But it was
generally believed, at the time of Confederation, that each language
group would retain autonomy over its own educational system, right
up to, and including, its universities.
98
Finally, a much more sympathetic understanding and
acceptance of the social role of religion prevailed at the time of
Confederation. The Quebec Act 1774 clearly contemplated that the
principal non-governmental institution for ensuring the cultural
survival of French-speaking Canadians was the Roman Catholic
Church 9 9 Moreover, in Quebec much of the private law of
"property and civil rights" was grounded in sectarian assumptions
What are known as CEGEPs (College d'enseignement g~rdral et professionel) are
junior colleges straddling secondary and tertiary education. They were a creation of the
Report of the Royal Commission on Education (Quebec: Queen's Printer, 1963-67), popularly
known as the Parent Report, and were intended initially to bridge the educational gap between
Quebec and the rest of North America.
98 See, for example, the statement by John Rose in Waite, supra, note 54, at 99-100.
99 See A.L. Burt, The Old Province of Quebec, voL 1: 1760-1776 (Toronto: McClelland
& Stewart, 1968) at 171 ff.
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(witness the submission of a draft of the Civil Code of 1866 to the
Vatican for approval).100 The key for English-speaking Quebeckers
in 1867, therefore, was to protect the position of their dissentient
Anglican and Protestant churches, and to guarantee the autonomy
of the socio-cultural activities of the church such as schools,
orphanages, poor houses, hospitals, and so on. This was no
misplaced concern, for the importance of religious institutions to
minority culture is starkly revealed by the contribution of the Roman
Catholic Church to the survival of the Acadians, Franco-Ontarians,
Franco-Manitobans, and Fransaskois.10 1 The erosion of the social
role of religion in the late twentieth century, and the necessary
replacement of sectarian social institutions by governmental
programs, was unthinkable in 1867. Yet the rapidity of the church's
decline in French-Catholic circles in the 1960s once again had the
indirect consequence of leaving the English-speaking community in
Quebec without effective control over the activities of its previously
independent, and initially religiously-based, social welfare institutions.
It follows that the socio-economic context which has evolved
within Quebec over the past thirty years changed many of the
fundamental social and institutional assumptions upon which the
political compromises in the Constitution Act, 1867 were originally
grounded. Necessarily, the government of Quebec has been
required to assume regulation of an economy that was becoming
increasingly industrialized and urbanized. Given its general
commitment to the social agenda of the welfare state, it was also
necessarily obliged to fill the vacuum created by the breakdown of
many French-language non-governmental social support systems.
Finally, given that the technological and telecommunications
revolution has exposed French language and culture to the
hegemony of the English language in North America, there
developed a compelling case for provincial regulatory activity over a
number of matters previously thought to fall within the sphere of
private activity.
100 The particular context of the codification project is examined in M. Caron, "De la
physionomie, de l'volution et de l'avenir du Code civil" in J. Boucher, 6d., Livre du centenaire
du Code civil, Montreal, University of Montreal Press, 1970 at 10.
101 For a discussion of the role of the church, see R. Arts, "Position du francais au
Canada: Bilan g6ndral," (September 1954) 165 Relations 260.
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Compounding the impact of these "necessities" on language
politics within provincial jurisdiction under section 92 have been
difficulties flowing from the socio-political assumptions underlying
the division of powers structure established in 1867. For with the
rise of Quebec economic nationalism, federal incursions into
provincial legislative jurisdiction via the spending power became
increasingly a point of contention. Exclusive federal jurisdiction over
the national economy - financial institutions, pension schemes,
taxation, trade and commerce - and over modern media, such as
telecommunications, came to be seen (rightly or wrongly) as largely
incompatible with the promotion of Quebec's distinctive linguistic
and cultural character. The governing ethos for each of these
initiatives and revendications has been the transformation since 1960
of the notion of survival in Quebec nationalist rhetoric. Defensive
jurisdictional claims based on an anti-statist appeal to the
prescriptive rights of nations which cannot be interfered with by the
federal government, has been replaced by expansive jurisdictional
claims based on a statist appeal to the right of peoples to
self-determination.
10 2
In view of this enhanced role which has been thrust upon
the provincial government, and the further role which it now claims
for itself, there is some justification for the English-speaking
community in Quebec to feel that it is no longer an important
element in the province. Indeed, the English-speaking minority is
now considered by many provincial political elites not even to be a
102 There are two separate facets of this transformation which bear notice. The first is
that jurisdictional boundaries between central and provincial governments tend to be less
disrupted by changing socio-economic circumstances where there is general consensus on the
political goals to be pursued, a sense of cultural affinity, and of relative empowerment in each
government. In other words, while other provinces underwent many of the same socio-
economic changes as Quebec, these did not all immediately present themselves as issues of
federalism and the division of powers. Indeed, it is only recently that they have appeared in
this light in Western Canada, for much the same reason that they did so in Quebec in the
1960s.
The second facet of the transformation in Quebec is that language and cultural
policy moved its locus from religion to the secular state. Nationalism is no longer the defence
of religious institutions from "foreign" (i.Le federal) governmental intrusions; it is the
deployment of governmental instruments. The role of the government is no longer to restrain
federal initiative so that non-governmental cultural and linguistic organizations can flourish on
their own terms; it is, rather, to exercise positively that legislative jurisdiction - a jurisdiction
previously awarded to the federal government.
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"founding people" of Quebec with a distinctive linguistic and cultural
character; it is merely another communaut culturel or ethnic group.
There is also some justification for its feeling the guarantees
negotiated in 1867 have proved illusory, and that its survival as a
linguistic community is also threatened.
The result of recent government language policies in Quebec
is that both pre-Confederation linguistic groups in Canada East now
justify their constitutional claims against a background of perceived
threats to their survival. Of course, and this is a key difference
between the threats to English-speaking and French-speaking
Canadians in Quebec, the English-speaking community is not
threatened with "extinction" per se.103 For even were the English-
speaking community in Quebec to disappear, this would not imply
the extinction of the English language in Canada. The
disappearance of the French-speaking community in Quebec
probably does, however, carry such an implication for the future of
the French language in Canada. In this very narrow sense, then, the
situation of the English-speaking minority in Quebec is more
analogous to that of French-speaking minorities outside Quebec. Its
demise does not threaten the continuance of the language in Canada
or in North America; it merely impoverishes the majority culture.
Yet because the ideas of extinction and survival are such powerful
rallying cries, their invocation has led to not very finely calibrated
perceptions of the threat actually faced by each language group.
Nowhere do these perceptions of which minority is truly
threatened, and of the required governmental response, clash so
much as in relation to the direct legislative regulation of language
questions. Once again this difference of perception can be traced
to changing understandings of the nature and role of government.
The implications of these changing understandings of government
for language regulation of non-governmental activity will be taken
up in the next section of this essay. Of immediate concern here is
the understanding which sustained the conception of governmental
bilingualism in the Constitution Act, 1867. At the time of
Confederation, constitutional entrenchment of bilingual courts and
103 It is important to understand the emotive power of the notions of survivance and
"extinction" in Quebec language politics. These concepts will be discussed in detail in the next
section of this essay.
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a bilingual legislative process was assumed to be sufficient, in the
federal arena, to protect the public political rights of all French-
speaking Canadians, and adequate, in Quebec, to protect the public
political rights of the English-speaking minority. In respect of those
public services which did exist, section 133 would guarantee a
bilingual face for both federal and provincial governments (that is,
what is here called official or institutional bilingualism) in Quebec,
but probably not elsewhere. In other words, the Fathers of
Confederation grounded the language provisions of the Constitution
Act, 1867 in three assumptions: first, that there would be no
significant "executive" acts that would touch the daily lives of citizens
- no extensive government services in the late twentieth century
sense of the expression; second, that only in Quebec need
governmental processes be undertaken in both French and English,
and services provided in either language according to demand; and
third, that section 133 would apply to the most significant of these
processes and services at the national level, while permitting regional
unilingualism in their actual delivery outside Quebec. As an
indication of the intended asymmetry of this bilingualism, it should
be remembered that, until comparatively recently, two of the original
Confederation partners with substantial French-speaking populations
- Ontario and New Brunswick - made little effort to mirror the
situation in Quebec. Indeed, in the case of the former, the
government often took active steps to promote unilingualism. It is
also worth noting that the federal government's own language
policies typically were deficient: it was not until the 1930s that
paper money and postage stamps were printed in a bilingual format;
and well into the 1960s that the federal public service outside
Quebec's borders, including the central bureaucracy in Ottawa, were
predominantly, if not exclusively, functioning in English.
Since the adoption of the federal Official Languages Act 04
in the late 1960s, however, the clear direction of federal policy has
been to complement the requirements of section 133 bilingualism
with a pan-Canadian programme of bilingual government services,
and to deploy government regulation of the private sector (for
example, in respect of packaging on consumer goods) to mandate
104 S.C., 1968-69, c. 54
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bilingualism - that is, to pursue a national policy of official
bilingualism. Similarly, in recent years the implications of section
133 are being pursued even by provinces, such as New Brunswick
and Ontario, to which it does not even formally apply. But in
Quebec, far from being understood in its initial sense of implying
institutional bilingualism where warranted, section 133 is now taken
by most politicians as stating an expressio unius maxim for public
sector services and as not bearing at all on governmental regulation
of the private sector. Ironically, over the last thirty years, as the
English-speaking community began to interact systematically with the
French-speaking majority in Quebec, that interaction has increased
linguistic tension, heightening the perception of a bona fide threat
to the French language and culture even within non-nationalist
political circles. How strange it would seem to the Fathers of
Confederation that the conflation of peoples with provinces now
means that it is certain English-speaking Canadians (led by the
English-speaking minority in Quebec) who are claiming that the
compact between French and English requires the extension of
bilingual services at the provincial level across the country wherever
numbers warrant; and that it is the Quebec government which is
arguing against a constitutional, or even moral, right to provincial
bilingualism for non-Quebec French-Canadians in Western Canada
- presumably in order to minimize its obligations towards its own
linguistic minority.
This last comment might be misinterpreted as an unfair
attack on Quebec's current constitutional position relating to
minority language educational rights or on its overall legislative
program of the past three decades. Therefore, the point should be
rephrased in somewhat different terms, which situate the province's
language legislation in a pan-Canadian context. It is important to
recall the design of the Constitution Act, 1867 and how its political
purposes are understood by present participants in Canada's
language debate. On one reading, the political deal of 1867 can be
understood as a clever conspiracy to accomplish the assimilation
agenda set out in the Durham Report by means of a divide and
conquer strategy (given the failure of the 1841 Union to do so by
direct political integration). This view is often also attributed to
certain Lower Canadian Tory members of the "Chateau Clique," and
is the favoured assessment of contemporary Quebec nationalists. On
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a second reading, the Constitution Act, 1867 can be understood as
a mechanism for reconciling the various regions of the new country,
and especially the Clear Grit faction in Upper Canada, to the
permanence of the French fact by limiting its constitutional presence
to Quebec and the Parliament of Canada. This, of course, is the
view usually ascribed to Sir John A. Macdonald. Some variant of it
also seems to sustain the constitutional position of many Western
Canadian governments today. On a third interpretation, the
Confederation arrangement can be seen as a recognition that
assimilation of Canada's French-speaking population was impossible,
that mere tolerance of this "quaint" people would only lead to racial
conflict, and that, therefore, nothing short of a constituted
government should be established to preserve and promote French
language and culture in Canada. Such an opinion was rarely heard
during the Confederation debates (except from George-Etienne
Cartier), although in a modified form it soon became the rallying cry
of the rouges under Dorion and Mercier, and survives today as the
ground for a number of policies pursued by non-separatist Quebec
governments.
This third interpretation is preferable, even though the
second seems to be a better explanation of why the Constitution Act,
1867 left non-Quebec Francophones in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick,
and Ontario vulnerable to legislative neglect or, worse, to spiteful
provincial activity. Before suggesting why the third interpretation is
to be preferred, and is actually closer to Macdonald's position than
usually thought, it is important to note that the current federal
policy of coast-to-coast official bilingualism was not advanced by any
participants in the Confederation debates. It is, in fact, largely the
creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicultur-
alism s05 in the 1960s. Historically, then, section 133 bilingualism was
a theoretically important, although in practice often ineffectual,
minority guarantee at the federal level for non-Quebec French-
speaking Canadians. Further, the potential for assimilation of
Francophones outside Quebec as a consequence of provincial
legislative activity, or non-activity, was soon perceived. More than
105 See Canada, Report of the Royal Comnission on Bilingualism and Biculturalisn
(Ottawa: R. Duhamel, Queen's Printer, 1967-70) (Co-Chairs: A.D. Dunton & A.
Laurendeau).
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anything else, it was this perception that led to Riel's initiative only
three years after Confederation to force the inclusion of a guarantee
of provincial section 133 bilingualism in Manitoba by means of
section 23 of the 1870 Manitoba Act.106 Of the other jurisdictional
transfers and side-constraints on provincial legislative authority in the
Constitution Act, 1867 that were made automatically applicable to
the new provinces of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, it
was the federal disallowance power, and the remedial power of
section 93 in relation to education, which were seen as serving to
compensate for the lack of express language guarantees in provinces
other than Quebec and later, Manitoba. Presumably, in 1867, even
those English-speaking constitutional negotiators most sympathetic
to the position of French-speaking Canadians, obviously unaware of
developments on the Red River, thought that the French language
and culture outside Quebec was doomed to a largely folklorique
future and, therefore, did not merit specific protection in provincial
constitutions. Only a negative federal power to prevent persecution
was seen as necessary. It can only be assumed that a positive
obligation upon the other three future provinces to preserve and
promote their various French-speaking minorities did not seem
either justifiable or politically saleable in 1867.107
These special federal disallowance and appellate powers were
not just understood as political devices for ensuring the hegemony
of the national government. They were also intended to function
in part as a minority language guarantee. For this reason, it is
understandable how the omission to use them in relation to
Manitoba's "official languages" legislation 10 8 in 1890, and shortly
thereafter in relation to the Manitoba Schools Question,10 9 and
106 S.C. 1870, c. 3. For a discussion of Riel's initiative, see Stanley, supra, note 70, at
107-125.
107 There is no mention in any of the Confederation debates in the Parliament of the
United Canadas of such an obligation being imposed on Ontario or on the Maritime
provinces. See Waite, supra, note 54.
108 An Act to provide that the English Language shall be the Official Language of the
province of Manitoba, S.M. 1890, c. 14, as rep. S.M. 1980, c. 3, s. 7.
109 For a discussion see, W.L. Morton, "ie Manitoba Schools Question and Canadian
Nationalism, 1890-1916' in Canadian Historical Association Report of the Annual Meeting
(Ottawa: C.H.A., 1951).
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during the first decades of the twentieth century, in relation to
Regulation 17 in Ontario,110 has come to be seen by non-Quebec
French-speaking Canadians as the first and crucial breaches of faith
by the English-speaking majority in Canada. Coupled with the
federal cabinet's refusal to invoke the prerogative of mercy to halt
Riel's execution in 1885 following the suppression of the North-
West Rebellion, these incidents revealed the limitations of
Macdonald's passive view of linguistic federalism. The federal
government failed in each case to assert leadership in maintaining
the moral underpinnings of the Confederation compromise,
preferring instead to acquiesce in the conflation of the notion of
French-Canadians with the Quebec government and to sacrifice
cultural and linguistic guarantees for federal/provincial harmony
through the appeasement of Oliver Mowat and Honor6 Mercier.
Thereafter, all such federal and supervisory guarantees were
made the hostage of provincial legislative majorities. By declining to
act at the end of the nineteenth century, the federal government
forfeited its legitimacy to address other issues relating to the political
meaning of the Confederation compact, as Laurier was to discover
during the conscription crisis of 1917. This legitimacy of the
Canadian government as guarantor of language rights has, in the
eyes French-speaking minorities outside Quebec, been just partly
recaptured by federal policies since 1968, and then only at great cost
to national programmes and institutions on the Prairies, and at a
corresponding loss of federal political legitimacy in those
constituencies. The reason that legitimacy in the eyes of French-
speaking minorities outside Quebec has been only partly recaptured
is because the federal government has refused, even as recently as
1988, in respect of educational rights on the Prairies, to exercise its
supervisory powers under sections 90 and 93, or to deploy the
spending power to ensure that provincial governments also respect
the spirit of the Confederation compromise.
111
110 Regulations of the Department of Education (1912-13); Regulation 17 was upheld
by the Privy Council in Trustees of tre Roman Catholic Separate Schools for the City of Ottawa
v. Mackell, [1917] A.C. 62.
111 In 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that section 133 of the Constitution
Act 1867 was not an entrenched right in Saskatchewan despite the inclusion of a similar
provision in section 110 of the order-in-council of 1870 that brought the North-West
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The early loss of federal authority to act as protector of
linguistic minorities has had widely differing consequences across the
country, depending on the relative economic and political power of
the minority in question. Take first the situation in Manitoba.
From a position of significant political power based on its relative
equality of population in 1870, the minority community in Manitoba
declined to minimal political power based on a small relative
population in the late twentieth century. As this occurred, the
meaning, if not the very existence, of the legal equality of English
and French languages established in the Manitoba Act of 1870 was
corrupted. Moreover, the decline to disempowerment occurred prior
to the rise of the welfare state. At this time the Franco-Manitoban
minority was not a financially independent urban population which
could maintain its own institutions. Consequently, because it also
did not profit from the growth of governmental social institutions at
a time when it could assert political power, it was never in a
position of attempting to preserve these institutions from
governmental neglect. Finally, given the failure of governments and
courts to understand section 133 as implying official bilingualism,
strict legislative and judicial rights under section 23 of the Manitoba
Act were all the French-speaking minority could claim by way of a
constitutional language guarantee; and it took almost ninety years
before the courts declared the validity of even these minor
guarantees in the constitutional challenges of Forest11 2  and
Bilodeau.
113
Yet, as intervenants in these challenges, such as the Societe
franco-manitobaine (sFM) also saw, to preserve the language and
culture of a politically disempowered minority in 1980, the key
factors are not complete judicial and legislative bilingualism, even
though these also would be desirable. What really counts is, rather,
guaranteed French-language social services and institutions. Hence,
Territories (of which the future province of Saskatchewan was a part) into the Union
(Rupert's Land and North-Western Territory Order, 1870). See Mercure, supra, note 89.
112 Forest, supra, note 89.
113 Bilodeau v. A.G. Manitoba, [19811 5 W.W.R. 393 (Man. C.A.). This case was
ultimately disposed of by the Supreme Court along with the Reference Re Manitoba Language
Rights, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 347 [hereinafter Manitoba Language Rights].
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under a post-Bilodeau compromise, the sFM proposed at one time
to trade off at least part of the French-speaking minority's section
23 rights as announced by the Supreme Court, including translation
of all post-1890 legislation and official records. These rights were
to be exchanged for: first, adequate social, educational, legal, and
cultural services; second, institutional recognition of the legitimacy
of the French language in the legislature, the courts, and govern-
ment departments; and third, a commitment to continuing legislative
translation of those statutes and regulations in force from time to
time. Yet, to date, the government of Manitoba has neither
responded to these proposals nor made much progress in complying
with the order of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Manitoba
Language Reference.
114
In Ontario, it is this type of functional bilingualization of
government services which is the goal now being pursued with some
success, even in the absence of a constitutional guarantee along the
lines of section 133, by the Association Canadienne-frangaise de
l'Ontatio (ACFO). Thus, despite being left out of the 1867
compromise due primarily to a lack of numbers, Franco-Ontarians
are now achieving a degree of political power. Over the century
since Confederation, their percentage of the Ontario population has
grown, and since their numbers are concentrated in certain regions
of the province, functional bilingualization of government services,
although probably not official bilingualism across the province, is
now a politically viable option. The current situation of
Franco-Ontarians in large measure parallels that of Franco-
Manitobans. That the constitutional position of the latter is more
secure is counterbalanced by its smaller size and less powerful
political position. This precarious parallel may not endure, however,
since the relative political power of Franco-Ontarians is growing.
Coupled with the greater sympathy of Ontario's political elite to
minority language guarantees, this growth may well, in some future
constitutional negotiations, lead to the achievement of section 133
bilingualism in that province. 1
114 Manitoba Language Rights, ibid.
115 The improved lot of Franco-Ontarians is evidenced by recent legislation such as the
French Language Services Act, S.O. 1986, c. 45.
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In view of this belated recognition of obligations to their
linguistic minorities by the governments of Manitoba and Ontario,
why then are efforts in Quebec being marshalled to move in the
opposite direction? Once again, it is the relative political power of
the minority at Confederation, and, at present, which has shaped
legal consequences. By contrast with the situation in Manitoba,
judicial and legislative bilingualism at the provincial level was, when
coupled with other Confederation arrangements, a sufficient minority
guarantee for English-speaking Quebeckers at a time of minimal
government and the two solitudes. The economic power and
numbers of the English-speaking community throughout the
nineteenth century enabled it to generate its own social institutions,
both in rural areas and in the cities of Montreal and Quebec.
Moreover, regardless of whatever position it may have been able to
command in provincial political circles, the English-speaking minority
in Quebec - unlike the country's other provincial linguistic
minorities - was always assured that it would be a part of the
linguistic majority in one of the federation's co-ordinate
governments, namely that in Ottawa. Finally, even with indus-
trialization and urbanization in the first half of the twentieth
century, the economic clout of the Quebec linguistic minority more
than compensated for the political disempowerment which
accompanied its increasingly smaller representation in the National
Assembly.
1 16
In all important respects, the linguistic minority in Quebec,
until quite recently, never had to play the diminished public role
usually assigned to such minorities elsewhere. Hence, even in the
one province where it was in the majority, French language and
culture was never as predominant as was English language and
culture in other Canadian provinces. The national economic power
of the English-speaking business community centred in Montreal,
and Quebec's situation in an overwhelmingly English-speaking North
America usually meant, therefore, that in situations of interaction
116 The evidence of this relative power was everywhere. Throughout the early twentieth
century there was a practice of alternating between English and French-speaking mayors of
Montreal; until 1973 there was always one English-speaking civil law justice on the Supreme
Court of Canada; even now almost one-quarter of the Quebec Court of Appeal is comprised
of English-speaking judges.
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with their English-speaking fellow-citizens (conducted, not
surprisingly, almost always in English), Quebec's French-speaking
population felt on the defensive. In such a socio-political context,
it is understandable how section 133 and especially its corollary,
official bilingualism, has even come to be seen as a trojan horse
within Quebec - not only for the public services which it demands
of l'dtat providence, but for the attitude of government towards
private economic activity which it entails.
Compare the situation in New Brunswick, where despite
being a sizeable minority - proportionately larger than any minority
other than the English-speaking community in Quebec - the
Acadians in 1867 were economically disempowered. They were
unable even to obtain the extension of section 133 to New
Brunswick. But this disempowerment began to be overcome in the
relatively recent past, aided especially by developments in the 1960s
at the federal level which testified to Ottawa's commitment to
protecting linguistic minorities outside Quebec. With the recharac-
terization and revalorization of their status, Acadians were able to
accede not only to the constitutional position of a section 133
minority, but to have New Brunswick declared officially bilingual. 17
Yet Acadians continue to lack the relative economic power
of the English-speaking minority in Quebec. Despite the creation
of the Universitd de Moncton, and various other institutions such as
the insurance company l'Assomption Vie, Acadians have not been
able to build up privately a comprehensive French-language social
support network. Only a policy of official bilingualism stands a
chance of empowering Acadians sufficiently so that French-language
social services, hospitals, and welfare agencies are likely to flourish.
In a nutshell, because a policy of official bilingualism in New
Brunswick is necessary in order to nurture the Acadian community,
such a policy can operate without threatening English language and
culture in the province.118 It is, moreover, a politically viable policy
117 Official Languages of New Bnotswick Act, S.N.B. 1969, c. 14.
118 Apart from the former Mayor of Moncton, Leonard Jones, most opposition to
bilingualism in New Brunswick has been driven by economic, not racial considerations. The
overall tenor of the New Brunswick Report on the Meech Lake Accord, supra, note 13 makes
this facet of the language agenda in the province transparent.
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given the absolute numbers, relative percentage, and geographic
concentration of French-speaking New Brunswickers.
To recapitulate, notwithstanding certain similarities in the
constitutional position of Canada's provincial linguistic minorities, the
political power exercised by, and social situation of, each of these
minorities are quite different. As a result, the practical conse-
quences of the varying models of bilingualism for each province are
also different. Canadian practice has shown that there are at least
three distinct types of bilingualism. In descending order of intensity
they are: official, or institutional bilingualism; section 133
bilingualism; and unofficial, or targetted and pragmatic, bilingualism.
Since the late 1960s, the federal Official Languages Act has
set the standard for official bilingualism. Given the relative
positions of the Acadian minority and the English-speaking majority,
this mode of official bilingualism can work (and, given the impetus
to include section 20(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, seems to have
been made to work) in New Brunswick. While the point is not free
from controversy, such a policy, or at least a policy of section 133
bilingualism, could work in Ontario. On the one hand, the
Franco-Ontarian community is sufficiently numerous, concentrated
and, because of the public services present in Ottawa, urbanized and
close to the centres of political power, that it can sustain such a
claim. On the other hand, in view of its small relative size (and
despite the protestations of the Alliance for the Preservation of
English in Canada to the contrary), there is no likelihood that a
policy of even official bilingualism will lead the province toward
French unilingualism. Furthermore, as of 1990, much of the
financial burden of section 133 bilingualism in Ontario has already
been borne, and as is becoming increasingly evident, the strong
commonality of interest between Canada's initial partners suggests
the opportunity for greater constitutional symmetry in their language
policies.
By contrast, given current socio-economic realities, complete
official bilingualism and its entailments cannot be a viable provincial
policy elsewhere in Canada. Nor can even section 133 bilingualism
be successful at the provincial level west of Manitoba or in the
Maritimes east of New Brunswick. For French-speaking minorities
in these provinces and territories, federal official bilingualism, plus
federal funding for unofficial or targetted bilingualism at the
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provincial or territorial level is probably their long-term
constitutional fate. Similarly, for Manitoba, the French-speaking
population today appears to be too small, in both absolute and
relative terms, to sustain the full panoply of entitlements associated
with a provincial policy of official bilingualism. While consti-
tutionally, the French-speaking minority has a right to section 133
bilingualism, as already suggested, the most effective guarantee of its
future might well be to compromise across-the-board judicial and
legislative bilingualism for judicial, legislative, and especially
institutional bilingualism along the lines now pursued in Ontario,
although as a constitutionally entrenched right.
For Quebec, as will be argued in detail in the next section,
the English-speaking economic and trade context of North America
and the continuing robustness of its linguistic minority even in the
absence of governmental promotion, are such that official
bilingualism, and especially its legislative entailments vis-t-vis the
private sector, might currently be too high a price for the majority
to pay for constitutional sainthood. There are three separate
aspects to this point. First, it is not suggested that a policy of
official bilingualism will always be a non-viable option for Quebec;
times, demographics, and symbols change. Second, section 133
bilingualism can no longer be politically defended as impliedly
requiring complete official bilingualism in Quebec - despite the
probability that this was intended in the Confederation compromise.
Of course, the English-speaking minority in Quebec does have a
constitutional right to judicial and legislative bilingualism, and can
certainly make a persuasive moral and political case for maintaining
the bilingualism of various social and educational institutions where
numbers warrant. But at least in the short-term, it has neither the
economic nor political clout to demand the full panoply of
government services implied by a policy of official bilingualism on
the federal model. Third, the legislative programme which official
bilingualism presupposes - equal promotion of both languages in all
public settings, complete freedom of choice in educational matters,
and an absence of regulation relating to language in private sector
activities such as advertising, consumer services, and labour relations
- is not presently a workable policy option for North America's only
jurisdiction which has a French-speaking majority. The reasons for
this will be addressed below.
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How to reconcile the case for enhanced federal and
provincial recognition of the claims of French-speaking minorities
outside Quebec (including even the case for intrusive federal action
if necessary), with the case for limitations imposed by the National
Assembly on certain linguistic claims of Quebec's English-speaking
minority (including even increased provincial jurisdiction over
matters touching language and culture), will be the principal political
challenge in the field of language rights for the 1990s. How to
structure constitutional allocations of legislative power and to design
the public policy instruments to achieve the latter aspect of this
challenge in a spirit of toleration and respect will require almost
Solomonic wisdom. The second part of this essay will be devoted to
an analysis of why this need for a highly contextualized equality for
linguistic minorities has come to arise, and what are likely to be its
implications for Canada's future constitutional arrangements in the
post-Meech Lake Accord period.11 9
119 It is important to make a further point about the use of the expression "linguistic
minority" in this, and subsequent, sections of this essay. It is nowhere suggested that within
each province the linguistic minority is a monolith: there are many French-speaking minorities
in Ontario, just as there are many English-speaking minorities in Quebec. Indeed, part of the
argument of this essay so far is that constitutional lawyers have been insufficiently sensitive
to nuances in the categories they invoke. It is also important to note that both within and
outside Quebec, there can be no easy identification of language and culture: while the
Constitution Ac4 1867 and the Quebec Act, 1774 may have been drafted with such an
assumption in view, nineteenth and twentieth century immigration to Canada has served to
dissociate the concept of an "official language" from the concept of the plural cultures which
may be represented among those who speak either of those languages. For these reasons, the
expression "linguistic minority" should be taken only to refer to the category of persons who,
in any particular province, identify themselves with the official language not spoken by the
majority.
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